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XVI. The Buddhist theory of cognition
unequivocal distinction, approved by the Yangas "), of the fruit from the Demonstrant; (132) because, through the identity of the one knower, it stands out as in a way not distinct from the Demonstrant; since only when evolved as Demonstrant is the self presented as an evolution as fruit. The person who knows is the same who accepts, abandons, and disregards, since so without fail is the experience of all practical persons. Otherwise there results for oneself and the opponent a confounding of the correlation of Demonstrant and fruit. Enough.
Or else, this first part is to be expounded otherwise: The Buddhists, forsooth, formulate a proof thus: 'Every existent is momentary 18): for every entity, of course, pot, etc., is seen to go to destruction in the proximity of a hammer, etc. Here, if that own form with which the pot, etc., perishes at the final stage exists in it as soon as it originated, then through that (own-form) it will have to perish immediately after its origination; so that its momentariness is manifest. Or, (if it is said) "It is born of its own*) causes with just such an own-nature that (only) after lasting for some time does it perish": Similarily then even in the presence of the hammer, etc.; since it has just that same own-nature, it should once more also last for precisely the same time. Thus it would not perish at all. This is "the principle of the trader who does not wish to give and who every day in a letter speaks of 'to-morrow'" 17). Therefore, if it arises with a power of lasting even for two moments, since in the second moment also it has just as in the first moment a power to last two moments, it would persist again for another pair of moments. And so in the third moment also, having that own-nature, it would not perish at all'.
It may be; that it was born from its own causes actually as lasting, but that by a conflicting force, hammer, etc., it is destroyed, that is not true. How again will this fit?: "It both does not perish, because it is lasting, and yet destruction of it is effected by a conflicting force"? For it is not possible that 'Devadatta is both alive, and his death is taking place'. Or it does perish; then how was that entity born from its own causes as imperishable? (133) For it is not logical to say, "he both dies and has the attribute of immortality". Therefore, since, if imperishable, its destruction at any time is illogical, and yet we see its destruction, it must be agreed that that entity was actually destructible when it arose from its own causes. Therefore it perishes just as soon as originated. And thus momentary perishing is established. And the working-out is as follows: 'what has a perishable own-form, does not last after its origination, like the own-form of a pot when at its final moment. And colour, etc. are of perishable own-form at the moment of their origination'. Here the Middle Term is the own-nature 18). If positive existences perish every moment, how then should there be the recognition "this is that same"? We say: it is due to the immediate origination of other and other similars, and to the effect of ignorance; at the very time of the destruction of a prior moment a similar next moment arises; therefore, as there is no difference of the form (ākāra) and no interval, even in the case of absolute annihilation the presentation affirming nondistinction, "this is that same", is begotten. Even in the case of things absolutely distinct. for instance things cut away and again originated, Kusa-grass, hair; etc., the presentation
*) sva-hetuto ha Das; hetuto AMP.
15) The Yangas (Naiyayikas), definitely realistic, uphold the existence of the object such as it is presented. The sense perceives and the mind-organ communicates the percept to the self.
1) We here introduce the famous kṣanikawa tenet of Buddhism, which will be further considered infra, vv. XVIII and XXVI.
17) On this everywhere appreciated proverb of 'to-morrow' see Col. Jacob's A third handful of popular Maxims, pp. 5-6.
18) On the suabhava-hetu, i. e. a reason which does not require any notion outside the entity itself, M. L. refers to Nyaya-bindu, pp. 65-73: see also Stcherbatsky, op. cit., II, p. 122 and Index.
