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108
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvādamañjarī
'Nor again in the form of large wholes. If the single atom is unestablished, how is there establishment of a plurality of them? And, that being so, a large whole in the form of an accumulation of them is mere verbiage. Moreover, this (whole) is regarded as a support for plural parts: and, if those parts are in conflict, then there is not one single large whole, because of the imposing of conflicting attributes. But, if not in conflict, there is a veto of presentation; because in a single large whole are observed (139) parts in conflict, mobile and immobile, red and not-red, covered and uncovered, etc. Morcover, does that (whole) which occurs in them occur integrally or in part? If it occurs integrally, then, through being used up even in one single part, it would not have occurrence in a plurality of parts; and, if it occurs integrally in each part, there is the consequence of a multiplicity of wholes. And, if it occurs fractionally there is conflict with the acceptance of its being without parts. Or, if it (the whole) has parts, are these parts distinct from it, or non-distinct? If distinct, then again, through occurrence in plural parts, as the one does not transcend the alternative of integral and single part, we have regressus ad infinitum. If not distinct, there would be no parts at all. And thus there is no external object at all. But, in fact, all this (world) is merely cognition shining out in the form of blue, etc.; since an external object, being non-intelligent, is unsuitable for shining out. As it is said
"begetting an awareness in their own-form the fields (sc. objects) of the sense-organs are not themselves visible" 36).
By the author of the Alankara") also it is said
"If blue is present in consciousness, how is it called external ?
If the blue is not present in consciousness, how is it called external" ?38)
If it is said, 'If the external object does not exist, to what then refers this appearance of pot, cloth, etc.?" surely it is without objective basis, being excited by false suffusion (vāsanā) without beginning; because it has no (external) range, like the cognition of a skyhair, or like the cognition in a dream. This is why it is said 3) -
"Nought other is to be experienced by awareness; thereof (i. e. awareness) there is no other experience.
Through the distraction (vaidhurya) of apprehended and apprehender it is itself only that appears.
For there is no external object, as is supposed by the innocent;
Thought, wallowing in suffusions"), proceeds in illusions of objects".
All this is objectionable. For 'cognition' is a word of action (a verb); from 'by it is cognized comes cognition'; or cognizing (jñapti) is cognition. And this must have an object (karma), because (140) a cognizing without object (visaya) does not fit. Nor should it be said, 'Cognition even without object is exemplified in the case of sky-hair'; because that also is not unequivocally without an object. For to one who is altogether without apprehension of the cognition of real hair that does not present itself. And cognition in a dream also, because it has for
30) The argument is that the objects are merely represented by the perceptions.
37) The Pramana-varttika-alamkara of Prajñākaragupta (M. L.): see Vidyabhuṣaṇa, History of Indian Logic, pp. 336, 344, and Stcherbatsky, op. cit., Index.
38) The epigrammatic verse affirms that the blue, if present to consciousness, is mental, and, if not, is not known at all.
39) The first two lines are quoted also in Nyaya-mañjari, p. 540, Sammati-tarka, p. 483, and the Bauddha chapter (II) of Sarva-darśana-samgraha.
4) Sc. impressions from prior experience (vasana), on which see note XV 24).
