________________
IVII. The Buddhist doctrine of Emptiness
115
ment of knower, because he transcends the range of the senses', that is establishinent of something established. But, as to the statement that this being mentally perceptible by the dresentation 'l' is equivocal', that is unestablished: because of the appropriateness of the introvert presentation 'I am in pleasure, I am in pain' only as ruposing upon the self. And to that effect they say -
"Pleasure, etc., when thought, is not experienced as independent; Rather, since it is penetrated by the sense of 'having', it proves apprehension on the
part of the self. The cognition this is pleasant' is not beheld like pot, etc.;
Rather the thought 'I am in pleasure' is illuminative also of the sell" 16). As for extravert presentation such as 'I am fair', 'I ain dark', that, of course, is applied metonymously (laksanaya) to the body because it is of service to the self; as in the expression 'I' in regard to a dear servant.
And as for the occasionality of the presentation 'I', here we have a sulfusion 17) as follows: The self, to begin with, has attention (upa yoga) 18) for mark; and that is regularly applied to either attention with form (ākāra), or to attention without form. The presentation 'I' also is simply a special instance of attention. And because of its variety, due to the extinction and appeasement of karma, its occasionality is verily appropriate, as it proceeds in dependence upon occasioning causes, namely sense-organ, non-sense-organ, light, object, etc. As the seed, even though it has the potency of begetting the shoot, does beget the shoot only when accompanied by the group of co-operant causes, namely earth, water, etc., and not otherwise. But not for that, despite the occasionality of its producing the shoot, is its power also of producing that occasional; since that (149) is in a way eternal. Similarly, although the self is always proximate, there is occasionality of the presentation 'I'.
Moreover, as for the statement, 'no invariable mark of it is observed', that also is unsound: because many marks, not existing without the Major Term, are observed of it. As thus: The observation of colour, etc., has an agent, because it is an action, like the action of cleaving: and the doer of it is the self*). And we have not here on the part of the eye, etc., a being doer, because these, being, like axe, etc., instruments, are not independent; and they are instruments*), because, as being material, they are without intelligence, because they are set in motion by another, and because they have no functioning independent of the operation of the user. For, if the agency should be on part of the sense-organs only, then, when they have been destroyed, how could there be origination of recollection of things previously experienced, and of the belief that there is one agent of the presentation by me seen, touched, smelled, tasted, heard? Moreover, as the sense-organs are restricted to their several spheres they have no capacity for the presentation of colour and taste together. And immediately after apprehending the colour of such and such a fruit, etc., there is a recollection of the taste accompany. ing it, because the flowing of the mouth-water is otherwise unaccountable. And so is inferred a single witness, like a spectator between two windows, of the colour and taste from two sense-organs. Therefore they are instruments, and the one who operates with them is the self. Again, movement capable of attaining or avoiding what is beneficial or non-beneficial, by way of taking up or avoiding the means, is preceded by effort; because it is a specific action, like
*) omitted by AMP.. 18) Quoted in Nya ya-mañjari (ed. p.433) (M. L.): see also Pramaya-na ya-tattväloka, commentary, VII. 55. 17) On väsanu see note XV). 18) On u payoga see note VIII ).
