________________
114
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvadamanjari
is set out otherwise; and on the part of these (Scriptures) whose own Demonstrativeness is pot settled, how is there competence for settling anything else! And so there is no knower.
And the Demonstrand is external object; and that has just been quashed "1) at the moment of the refuting of external objects. (147) A Demonstrant is a cognition revealing itself and other: and this, in the absence of a Demonstrand, what is it to apprehend? Since it has no object. Moreover, it must be supposed as either synchronous with the object, or as belonging to a different time, when it apprehends the same. On the first alternative, all things whatever found in the Triple Universe would appear in it, because there is no distinction in their being synchronous. On the second, however, it would be without form (äkära), or with form. In the . first case, there is no accounting for its outlining a definite object. In the second, again, would this form be distinct or non-distinct from the cognition. In case of non-distinction the form is the cognition itself; and there is also the fault of the alternative of forinlessness. In case of distinction if this (form) has the aspect of thought (cid-ripa), then the form (ākāra) also should be knower (vedaka); and so would this too, as formless, or :48 with form, be the knower of the thing? And so, as this recurs, there is regressus ad infinitum. Or, if not of the form of thonght, would it be as non-cognized or as cognized cognizer of that? On the former supposition it would be a bringing of that to mind in Maitra as well as in Caitra 2). But, in the latter, would there be cognition of it also by a formless cognition, or by one with form ? And so, as the point recurs, there is regressus ad infinitum.
"As thus there is no Demonstrant, whence can come the act of knowing (pramili) which is in the form of result (fruit) thereof? So that simply universal emptiness is the ultimate reality. And so they quote -
"The more, the more they are considered, the inore, the more do they dissolve.
If this itself appears from objects themselves, where do we stand in regard to it?"13) So much for the proliminary alternative.
But the refutation at large of Demonstration is to be discovered from the Tattvopa plava. simha!).
Here we album it reply: Surely this statement prollered by the god-beloved for the demonstration of the emptiness-doctrine, - is it empty, or not empty? If empty, then, since it is void of every trait (u pākhyā), nothing is by it, as by a sky-flower, established, (148) or negated. And therefore the systein of the tetrad of reals, Demonstrant, etc., meets with no opposition. And, if not enpty, then the wretched 'emptiness' doctrine is dissolved. Since by Your Worships' actual statement there would be exception to the emptiness of everything. There also that Blessed thing 18) is untroubled.
Nevertheless, with a view to maintaining the convention of the logicians, some endeavour to establish it is refuted. So, as for it having been said, “By perception there is no establish
1) The expression seems to indicate that the substance, at least, of the present Buddhist argument has been taken from some particular text.
12) It would be cause of thought in B as well as in A, because, being not cognized by A, it is not
The first line of the verse recurs (with a variant) in the Sarva-darxana-samgraha (II, Bauddha.. chapter).
14 t h of unknown authorship M. L.). But in Prameyi-kamala-murtayda (ed. fol. 195) is a mention
a thitur pluridin, aitimmer eifrin oi reals' (evidently a Madhyamiku disputant), whose object was to mal taxonuts out of ituntenne (nirmukhi-karawa).
14, Tha: ljussed Thing': l'robably the above-mentioned Tetrad (catusta yi).
