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XVII. The Buddhist doctrine of Emptiness
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removed by the practice of their adversaries, the three jewels 26). And, as in one whose faults are extinct absolute cognition (kerala-jñāna) is unfailing 27), there is omniscience. And the establishment of this is that 'gradation in cognition has some terminus, because it is gradation: like the gradation of sizes in space': also minute, covered, and distant objects are perceptible to someone, because they are objects of inference; like the fire located in a mountain cave'. Similarly may be stated as reasons the otherwise unaccountable non-falsification of astronomical cognitions prognosticating eclipse of sun and moon. So likewise the Scripture composed by an omniscient authoritative person is verily Demonstrant. For want of authority in them (scriptures) is dependent upon faults in the composers; because of the text
"Either from passion, or from aversion, or from delusion is an untrue speech spoken; But whoso has not these failings, on his part what should cause want of
truth?"28) And the composer's freedom from failings has been actually justified. So from Scripture also a self is established, because of texts such as "One self"28), etc. Thus accordingly by perception, inference and Scripture a knower is established.
A Demonstrant has been just previously established, in the establishment of external objects. And, that being established, that the Demonstrant is cognition, and in the absence of a Demonstrand what is that to apprehend, because it has no object ?*39), is mere babble. For without an instrument the accomplishment of an action is not logical; because it is so seen in the case of cutting, etc. (152) And, as for it having been said 'Synchronous with the object, etc.' (p. 114), in regard to that both alternatives are actually adopted. For in the case of ourselves, etc., perception is skilled in considering synchronous objects; recollection is apprehensive of past objects, and communication (sabda) and inference are delimitant even of objects belonging to all three times, and these are both without form (ākāra). Nor is there over-extension of the argument; because it goes on regularly by virtue of the differences in the extinction and appeasement of the obstacles to energy *), veiling one's thought. Of the remaining suggestions non-adoption is refutation.
But the act of knowing, as fruit of the Demonstrant, is actually established by one's own self-consciousness; for, where there is experience, there is no need for instruction. And fruit is twofold, because of the distinction into immediate and mediate. Among these, the immediate fruit, in the case of all the Demonstrants, lies in the stopping of want of cognition. With mediacy the fruit in the case of absolute knowledge is, first of all, indifference, and in the case of the remaining Demonstrants relinquishment, acceptance and disregard. Thus the tetrad of knower, etc., is well founded. And therefore that -
Not non-existent, not existent, not existent and non-existent, nor even distinct from
those, -
Freed from the four alternatives is reality known by the spiritual" 32), -- is insane talk.
26) Right outlook (faith), Right cognition and Right conduct: see Outlines of Jainism (Index).
*7) On kevala-jntäna see Outlines of Jainism, pp. 60, 65, 109-116, Pravacana-sära (trans. Faddegon, pp. 39–40), 1. v. 60.
*8) Source untraced. **) Sthänănga of the Jain Canon, I. 1 (M. L.). so) See supra, p. 114.
91) On the 'obstacles' (antara ya-karma) and on 'extinction' (ksaya, 'waning' and 'appeasement' (upasama) see Outlints of Jainism, pp. 31, 48, 50.
*) A partly similar verse is given by Candrakirti, Madhyamaka-vrtti, I. 8 (ed. p. 31).
