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XVI. The Buddhist theory of cognition
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range objects experienced as seen, etc., is not without objective basis. And to this effect the author of the Mahābhāsya ) -
“Things experienced, seen, thought of, heard, disturbance of bodily factors, divinities,
watery country,
Are the causes of dreams'; also merit and sin; not non-existence". And what is field (object) of cognition is external object. If it is said, 'This is illusion', - God bless you! For illusion is recognized in cases where, after somewhere seeing a primary object, there is through dullness of the organ mistaken apprehension of it elsewhere; as the illusion of silver in regard to mother of pearl. If one speaks of illusion in regard to an entity, though capable of practical efficacy, then the correlation of illusory and non-illusory is dissolved. And so this saying is true:
"Those who are satisfied with imagined sweatmeats, and those who have tasted
sweat meats,
Have equally, it follows, the savour, efficacy, digesting and so on" 42). Nor do those refutations of external ebjects inconvenience the maintainers of the Quodammodo doctrine; because they have accepted objects in the form of atoms, and also in the form of large wholes. And what has been stated in the refutation of the atom-alternative, (namely) 'because of absence of proof', is untrue; since their (the atoms') products, the pots, etc., are perceptible, they also are in a way perceptible; and that by way of the Yogin's perception they are directly perceptible must be taken for certain: the non-observation is due to minuteness. From inference also there is establishment of them, as thus: There are atoms, because otherwise there is no accounting for the creation of large wholes, this being an 'interior comprehension (antar-vyāpti) €3). Nor is it the whole truth that large things originate from atoms; (141) because we can conceive manifestation of cloth, etc., which are large, from heaps of thread, etc., which also are large; and because we have previously pocketed the fact that the self, ether, etc., are not material“). Where again there is origi nation of them (wholes) from atoms, that origination dependent upon extreme conjunction"), brought about by virtue of action requiring also the apparatus of such and such time, etc., is actually not false. As for the quotation, "moreover, this (is) support for plural parts" (p. 107), there also the term "whole' is used of what occurs not entire in plural parts in some ways conflicting. As for the mention of imposition of contradictory attributes in case of being support of plural parts which are in conflict, that is in a way, in fact, agreed; because that also, as consisting of so many parts, is in a way of plural form. As for the suggestion that 'moreover, this, occurring in them, would occur integrally, or fractionally, etc.', the answer is simply non-acceptance of the two alternatives; because we adopt an occurrence of the whole, not in its entirety, in the parts. Moreover, if the external object does not exist, what is it that now presents itself with determinate form (ākūra) in this blue'. II it is said, "This is a form (äkära) of consciousness', - No! Because the consciousness is of a thing external to the cognition; while, if it were a form of cognition, the presentation would
1) Jinabhadra-ganin, in whose Viseşāvasyaka the quoted passage occurs as Gatha 1703 (M. L.). **) On this well-known maxim see Col. Jacob's A second handful of popular Maxims, p. 11.
"S) I. e, a part of a wider inference, there being also other classes of things of which 'existence' could be proved by a parallel argument. For à more precise explanation by Haraprāsād Shastri see his Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, pp. v-vii, relating to the Antar-vyāpti-samarthana, by Ratnākaraśānti, included therein: see also Randle, Indian Logic in the earlier schools, p. 241, n. 1.
"1) And therefore not in conflict with the argument concerning the atoms, although they have infinitesimal parts (pradeśa).
45, This would apply to the formation of molecules (do yanuka, etc.) from atoms.
