________________
110
F. W. Thomas, Mallişeņa's Syādādamañjari be 'I am a blue thing"), and not 'this is blue'. If it is said, 'Because of the distinction of form in cognition severally, to some person the appearance is 'l', to some person it is 'blue', - "No!, because the form l' is not like the form 'blue', etc., fixed (ryavasthita); and so the same presentation which to one person is 'l', is presented to another as thou'; but the form 'blue', etc., is fixed, because by all it is apprehended as of one form. Although by people who have eaten their bellies full, blue, etc., are apprehended as yellow, etc., neverthelessthis does not make an exception, because that is illusory. If it is said, 'The appearance 'l is in the consciousness of self by self', - Surely, is there consciousness of another also ? How otherwise is there the use of the word 'self'? (142); for this is an antithetic word, applied only in view of another. If it is said that “Through illusion we have the presentation of distinction even in own-form', - Ho! How is a distinction presented by perception not real? If it is said, 'the perception is illusory', - surely why this? If it is said, 'Because by inference the non-distinction of cognition and object is established', we ask: 'what is that inference? If it is said, Thal wberewith accompanied a thing is regularly observed is not distinct therefrom; as the unreal moon from the real moon: and the object is regularly observed jointly with the cognition. This is non-observation of a comprehensive; comprehensive of the denied distinction 47) of cognition and object would be non-regularity of joint observation thereof; thereof there is non-observation; because of two differents, blue and yellow, there is no regular simultaneous observation. By this inference there is establishment of the non-distinction of the two;' - No! Because that is a fallacious inference, since it has a dubious ambiguity. For cognition is conscious of itself and other; this by mere consciousness of other apprehends the blue, and by mere consciousness of self apprehends the awareness of blue. And so through the simultaneous apprehension of the two there is regularity in the joint observation; and (yet) non-distinction there is not. And thus, because the absence of the Middle Term"), in the form of regularity of joint observation, from a counter-instance is dubious, there is dubious unequivocality.
And the regular joint observation is unestablished; because when with extravert attention an object 'this blue is experienced then it is that there is non-experience of the internal experience of blue; so how is there illusoriness in the perception through establishment by inference of the non-distinction of cognition and object? Moreover, the inference ") gets its being froni the fact that the perception has not its object vetoed by illusoriness, and, when the inference has been realized, there is illusoriness of the perception; so a fault of mutual dependence also is unavoidable. And in the absence of an object whence comes the presen. tation (of it) with a definite place as locus ? For a restricting reason to the effect that 'this has to be superimposed so) on that intended place, and not elsewhere does not exist. If it is said, 'the restriction in the superimposition thereof is through a restriction by suffusion (bias)', - No! Because that also is not a cause of this restriction of place. For, if there is actuality of the object, the experience has the place where the object is, and the thereby preceded suffusion has that place. But, if the external object is not actual, to what is its (the suffusion's) restriction of place due ? Or else, if it is said, "There is, of course, a restriction of the superimposition.
4) Rather perhaps 'I am a blue cognition'.
"7) Non-regularity of joint observation would cover all cases of separate observation, and no such nonregularity is observed.
+8) A counter-instance (sc, separation of object and consciousness), might occur, because in the actual occurrences a double character is observed; and, if so, the Middle Term would be equivocal; but, as the occurrence is unverified, the equivocality is dubious.
**) The very need for the inference arises from the fact that the perception is not otherwise found to be illusiry.
5" By cognition: on öropa see note XV 30).
