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XVI. T'he Buddhist theory of cognition
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etc. ? Not the first, because through absolute remoteness it can (by us) be reached only by faith. Not the second, because vetoed by experience. For not even in a dream have we the presentation this atom, this atom"; because our self-consciousness arises always only in the form "this pillar", "this jar". Nor again is there establishment of it by inference; because in consequence of the supersensibleness of atoms a non-existence apart from them cannot be apprehended in respect of any mark").
Moreover, would these (atoms) be eternal or non-eternal ? If eternal, have they practical efficacy gradually, or all at once! Not gradually, because through difference of own-nature 13) their non-eternality follows. Nor all at once; for, since in one single moment the atom effects all its practical efficacy, and that in the next moment is absent, its non-existence (then) follows. If non-eternal, are they momentary, or do they last to another time? If momentary, are they with a cause, or without a cause ? li without a cause, their existence or non-existence (138) would be eternal, because non-dependent. For to belong to an occasion is through dependence. If with a cause, are they caused by something large, or by atoms? Not something large, because external objects are accepted only in the form of atoms. And not by aloms; for these would produce their effects cither while existing, or while not-existing, or both existing and not existing. Il existing, is it at the very moment of their origination, or at a subsequent moment ? Not at the moment of origination, because then they are busy merely with their origination. Or, if it is said, 'Because of the text:
"their bare being (bhūti) is called also their action (kriya), and the same their being
cause"34), their very being (bhavanam eva) is what causes the origination of other's', - thus then the atoms of colour would be the material cause of the atoms of savour, and the latter of the former; because in regard to both there is no difference in bare being (bhavana). Nor at a subsequent moment, because they have perished. But, if while non-existing they originale those, then it follows that, except at a single moment of their own existence, there would always be originating thereof; because in their non-existence there is at all times no difference. And the alternative of both existing and non-existing is actually infected with contradiction in view of the text, -
"An objection that exists to each severally, how does it not apply in the case
of both ?"35)
So the atoms are not momentary: Nor again lasting into another time; because that shares the fortunes of the momentary alternative.
'Moreover, even if these last for some time, are they averse to practical efficacy, or are they engaged in it? In the first case, it follows that they are like the sky-flower, non-existent. On the latter supposition, would they produce effects of non-existent form, or existent form, or of both forms? If of non-existent form, why do they not cause also the hare's horn, etc.? If in the form of an existent, we have, with a making of the (already) existent, regressus ad infinitum. But the third distinction has a bad odour of contradiction as above. Therefore an object in the form of atoms fits nowhere.
»2) Sc. any mark to serve as a Middle Term in an inference on the ground of not occurring in anything
else.
»3) Because, if they act gradually, they change in the process.
3) Quoted in Bhāmati (Calcutta, 1891), p. 361, Bodhicaryavatāra panjika (Caleutta, 1902), p. 376 (where see Poussin's note): also in Sammati-tarka, 455, and Pramāna-naya, I, 15 (Comm.).
*) Quoted also in Pramana-mimämsä, I. i. 33.
