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106
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Sydvādamasjari
of x. Therefore, since a cognition not originated from # and not having the form of r is indifferent as regards all objects, an apprehension of everything would result'; - Not so: because even without a being begotten by t, appropriateness (yogyatā), defined as destruction and cessation of the veilings 27), justifies the illumination of particular definite objects. Also even with origination from it (the object) appropriateness must necessarily be agreed. Otherwise, there being proximity of all objects, whence in the world comes the differentiation so that even with non-proximity of such and such objects there is birth of a particular cognition only from a particular object ?
As for its (i. e. the cognition's) having the form (ākāra) thereof (i. e. of the object), that, in the first place, is not accountable by a transference of the object-form; because of the consequence that the object would be without form, and the consequence that the cognition would be with-form. And what sort of likeness has the 'non-corporeal cognition to the corporeal object? Thus it i. e. being with form) must be accepted only as a development 28) in the apprehension of a particular object. Therefore
"With the object he does not associate it (the cognition), without its having the form of the object; Since from it there is a reaching of the thing to be known, the Demonstrant is the
having the form of thing to be known (meya)"29). So much for that. (137)
Moreover, these two (sc. the arising of r and the having form of r) should be cause of apprehension either separately or in aggregate; if separately, then we get the first moment of the potsherd apprehending (through succession) the past moment of the pot, and the moon in water (through similarity) the moon in the sky. Because they (pot and potsherd) originate in due succession, and have the form thereof. Or, if in aggregate, then it follows that the later moment of the pot apprehends the previous moment of the pot; since both of these (conditions) are actual. If it is said: "(Only) when there is the form of cognition are these two causes of apprehension', - then it would result that a cognition of the same class would be apprehensive of the immediately preceding cognition; because these two have actually the relation of begotten and begetter. And so, except suitability, we see no other cause of apprehension.
Now we proceed to expound the latter half. And here we refute those particular Buddhists 30) who maintain a non-duality of cognition without reference to external objects. And their view is as follows: "Mere cognition, unmarked by the blot of apprehended and apprehender, etc., and without an universe (nisprapanca) is the ultimate real. And an external object does not even bear consideration. As thus: What is this external object? Is it in the form of atoms, or in the form of large wholes ? Not, to begin with, in the form of atoms, because of absence of a Demonstrant. For Demonstrant is either perception or inference. Now perception is not equipped for establishing that. For would it be on the part of the Yogins31) or of ourselves,
97) Se. obstacles, psychical and physical, to the perception. Āvarana is here used in a Jain sense, as denoting certain species of karma: see Outlines of Jainism, pp. 27, 30-1. 'Destruction' and 'cessation' also are the Jain ksayopasama, on which see ibid. The general sense is that the appropriateness results from the percipient's particular state and history.
28) Not as a resemblance between presentation and object.
29) The verse is quoted in Pramana-mimämsä, I. i. 26, and also in the Bauddha-chapter (Ii) oi Sarvadarsana-samgrala, and ill Prameyu-kamala-märtanda, fol. 127b.
3) Se. the Vijčana-matra school, on which see the note 1) to ch. XVI.
31) On the power of Yogins to see atoms see supra p. 41. The Yogin's perception is discussed also by Dharmottara: see Stcherbatsky, op. cit., II, pp. 30 sqq.
