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F.W. Thomas, Mallişena's Syūdvādamañjari "this is that same" is actually exemplified; so why is it not so supposed in the present case also ? Therefore that every existent is momentary is established. And in the present case the prior moment is the basis (upādāna-kārana), the posterior moment is the construct (upā. deya)
Having in this way adopted the opponent's view, he says: 'not simultaneous, etc.'. 'These prior moments which perish without residue, like a necklace (broken) in pieces, do they, in begetting the later moments, beget them actually at the time of their own origination, or at a later moment? Now, not the first, because between two things occurring simultaneously, as of the two bosoms of a young woman, there is not the relation of basis and construct. Hence it is well said 1%): (134) 'Not sinultaneous is the existence of fruit and cause'. Nor the second: as then destroyed without residue the prior moment has perished, how can it be even supposed to beget the posterior moment? And an origination without a basis has not been witnessed, because that goes too far. So it has been well stated: 'when the cause has lapsed, there is not the being of a fruit'. The word meaning of these two quarter-stanzas has been stated earlier. However, here the meaning is: 'fruit', the construct, 'cause', the basis, their relation' (bhiva) is the relation of basis and construct.
As for what Mokşākaragupta) immediately afterwards babbles for the establishment of momentariness, that has no opening in the Quodammodo doctrine, because, except for the perishing without residue, it is in a way an establishment of what is already established, since the maintainers of equivocality "1) agree to destruction moment by moment of the States. And, as for the statement made, 'for it is not possible that Devadatta is both alive, and his death is taking place' (p. 103), that also, simply because of its possibility, brings no harm to the maintainers of the Quodammodo doctrine; seeing that life is maintenance of the vital airs, and death is a destruction of a splinter of life (äyur-dalika-kşaya). Hence, even while Devadatta lives, his dying is quite agreed, because of the destruction every moment of the splinters of life, all in flight. Nor should it be said that "because of the destruction of all the splinters of life only at the final stage the designation 'death is logical only, in regard to that"; for even at that stage there is not destruction of it in toto. For even in that case there is destruction only of the remaining splinters, and not, on the contrary, of them all together at that moment. Thus is established a dying, moment by moment, beginning with conception. So enough of disquisition.
Or else an exposition otherwise: For Buddhists, in fact, cognition is begotten by the object (artha). And that cognition apprehends the same object which begets it; because of the text: "a non-cause is not the object (visaya)" 22); and therefore the object is cause, and the cognition effect. And that is not attractive; for then at the moment when there is existence of the object in its own-form, the cognition is not yet being originated; since it (the cognition) is at that time occupied merely with its own origination. And at that moment when the cognition has arisen, (135) then the object has gone. The relation of effect and cause requires a relation of prior and posterior time; and there is no lasting beyond a moment; so how is there origination of the cognition, the cause having lapsed ? And, as that has lapsed, it follows that the cognition lacks an object; since in your view only the cause is its object. And a cognition without object is absolutely without proof, like the cognition of a hair in the sky. And an object-moment (merely) accompanying the cognition is not apprehendible; because it
19) I. e. in v. XVI. 20) Buddhist author of a Tarka-bhāşă: see Vidyābhūşana, A History of Indian Logic, pp. 346-7. 2) The Jains.
22) Quoted in Prameya-kamula-mārtanda, fol. 148a, Sammati-tarka, p. 658. M.L. notes a variant reading jnana-kāraṇam, 'cause of cognition in place of nākārawan, 'a non-cause').
