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F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvādamañjarī
establishment of presentation of the object", affirms as follows:
"For an appearance of blue is an act of thought, since therefrom is concluded a presentation of blue. For as for the things, i. e. eye, etc., wherefrom the cognition arises, not by virtue of these can the cognition thereof be correlated (made out) as a consciousness of blue, but what is being experienced as similar to blue is correlated as consciousness of blue. Nor is the relation of thing to be established and establisher here conditioned by a relation of produced and producer 10); so that in one matter there should be a contradiction; but rather by the relation of correlated and correlate; hence that of a single matter one aspect should be the Demonstrant, and another the fruit of the Demonstrant, is not conflicting. For the reason of the correlation is identity of aspect in that cognition, and the thing to be correlated has the aspect of consciousness of blue", etc. (131) - this also is unsound; because in regard to one single partless cognition-moment a pair of own-natures defined as correlate and correlator is illogical; and because a relation of correlate and correlator also, being, as a connection, resident in a pair, cannot exist in what is single.
Moreover, similarity to the object is having the form of the object; is that (similarity) in the form of certitude (niscaya) "), or of non-certitude? If in the form of certitude, let it be itself the correlator; why suppose both? If not certified, then, how is it, being itself not correlated, competent for correlating the consciousness of blue, etc.? Further, what is this 'having the form of the object'? Is it a transformation in apprehending the object, or is it a wearing of the form of the object? Not the first, because that is an establishing of what is already established 12). But the second, since the cognition imitates the form of the thing to be known, is infected by the fault of consequent non-intelligence 13) and so on. Thus an unequivocal non-distinction of the fruit from the Demonstrant is not very good. For in the case of total identity there is no correlation of knowledge and fruit, because of the contradiction in their being so. Nor in the case of the total identity is 'similarity is Demonstrant, attaining the fruit', well-founded, because of over-extension.
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If it is said, 'Surely in the Demonstrant the similarity is the exclusion of non-similarity 14), while the attaining is the exclusion of non-attaining; so that through distinction in the exclusion there is in even a single thing a correlation as proof and fruit', - Not so; because without distinction in own-nature a distinction in exclusion of other (things) is not accounted for. And how should there not be, like correlation of Demonstrant and fruit through the exclusion by the Demonstrant of the non-means and non-fruit, correlation of 'being non-means' and 'being non-fruit' through exclusion also of other knowledge and other fruit? Because an entity has exclusion, as from the heterogeneous, also from the homogeneous. Therefore the fruit is to be accepted as in a way actually different from the Demonstrant, because (the two) are presented with the status of thing to be established and thing establishing. For two things which are presented with a relation of thing to be established and thing establishing are mutually distinguished, as axe and the action of cleaving. Likewise to be rejected is the
existing in the object, but as a classificatory resemblance to other presentations of blue: see Stcherbatsky's translation and notes in Buddhist Logic, II, pp. 42sq
10) Dharmakirti here disowns the conception of a relation between thought and content such that the latter has for cause the external object or the organs of perception: he substitutes a correlation internal to the presentation itself This the Jain author proceeds to criticize.
11) Dharmakirti himself had gone on to speak of certitude, which implies a judgment.
12) Everyone admits a psychical modification in perceiving.
13) In copying the object the cognition would copy its unthinkingness.
14) This, adduced by Dharmakirti in the present context (see Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 44 and n. 2), applies the apoha doctrine concerning the import of terms, on which see p. 90.
