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XVI. The Buddhist theory of cognition
101
strant because it has the form of attaining" 3). "In both', in perception and inference; 'one same cognition', defined as perception and inference, is the 'fruit', the outcome. Wherefore? 'Because it has the form of attaining', the form of outlining. As thus: Cognition arises only in the form of outlining. Nor is there fruit of cognition other than outlining, because of nondistinction of locus); and so altogether there is no fruit distinct from perception and inference.
And this is not correct. For: What is from anything unequivocally non-distinct, arises together therewith; as with pot pot-ness. And they admit a relation of effect and cause between Demonstrant and fruit, - saying that means of proof is cause, and fruit is effect'). And in case of absolute non-distinction that does not fit. For between the two, as arising simultaneously, a relation of effect and cause, as between the left and right horn of a cow, is not logical; because the cause invariably occurs at a prior time and the effect invariably occurs at a subsequent time. It is thus that he says: Not simultaneous is the existence of fruit and cause'. Fruit is effect, cause is what makes it; their existence, own-form, existence as effect and cause; that; simultaneous, synchronous, is not logical. That is the meaning.
Now, anticipating a statement that As the two have an interval of a moment, there will be successiveness of them. (130) he says: "when the cause has lapsed, there is not a being of the fruit. The cause, i. e. what causes, defined as the Demonstrant; having lapsed, disappeared without residue, immediately after its origination, because of being momentary; there is not a being, existence, of the fruit, of the product of the Demonstrant; because it has no root. For it is while the cause of the fruit is existent that we have the presentation of that this fruit'; not otherwise, because that would go too far).
Furthermore, the relation of cause and fruit is a connection; and this can only be in a pair. And Your Worship, initiated only into momentary perishing, does not tolerate a connection of the two. So how have we the severally determined presentation 'this is the cause, this is the fruit: because, if even with apprehension of one thing there is no apprehension of another, that is impossible; because of the text -
"Consciousness of connection as residing in a pair does not come from thinking of one form;
(Only) if there is an apprehension of the own-form of two things, is there knowledge of connection" ").
Although Dharmottara in commenting on the Nyaya-bindu-sutra) to the effect that "consimilarity) of object is the proof thereof, because it is by virtue thereof that there is
3) The knowledge is mental, as being outcome of a mental knowing. M. L. refers to Nyaya-bindu, I. 18, where, however, the expression is not form of attaining' (adhigama-rupa), but 'form of presentation of the thing'. But adhigama-rupa can be seen in Dharmottara's commentary (ed. Peterson, p. 20 1. 3; Stcherbatsky, p. 16, 1. 9), and in the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi rendered from Tibetan by Stcherbatsky in Buddhist Logic, II, pp. 378 sqq. (see p. 379 n. 2).
4) Both take place in one mind or cognitive process.
*) A Buddhist statement in these terms is perhaps not producible, but the use of the word phala, 'fruit', 'outcome, may be sufficient. See also the discussions by Jinendrabuddhi and Dharmottara in loc., and the expression kärana-hetu, 'cause-reason', and -phala, in Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (Index).
6) Any time when the cause is not existent would equally serve.
7) The verse is quoted in Devasuri's commentary on Pramana-naya-tattvaloka, I. 19, and (line 1) in Abhayadeva's commentary on the Sammati-tarka (ed. pp. 2, 265).
*) The Nyaya-bindu of Dharmakirti is not usually termed sutra: Mallişena perhaps used the expression as equivalent to mula, distinguishing the text from Dharmottara's commentary. The passage is text I. 20 (M. L.). The following passage from the commentary may be seen on p. 19 of Peterson's edition, Stcherbatsky, p. 15,11. 16 sqq.
*) This is not to be understood as an actual likeness of the blue as presented by a supposed external blue
