Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 81

80
F. W. Thomas, Mallişeņa's Syädvādamanjari
Or, if it is said, 'Since perception is affirmative, how has it the power of negation? For perception apprehends the own-form of an entity as 'this', and does not deny any other ownform: because of this text
-The wise declare perception affirmative, not negative;
Tradition (āgama, orthodox view) as to unity is therefore not vetoed by perception").
No! without denial of any other form) the outlining of the thing's own-form also is impossible: for blue, distinguished from yellow, etc., is that which is apprehended as 'blue', not otherwise; because the very notion (prati patti) of the own-form of an entity as (in) itself (kevala) is in the form of the notion of denial of any other; like the apprehension of negation of pot in the apprehension of the bare earth-surface 1). Therefore, just as perception is admitted as affirmative, so it must be admitted as negative also.
Furthermore, if it is agreed that perception is only affirmative, why is not ignorance affirmed, just as knowledge is affirmed, by perception?) - and so there is the consequence of duality 12); and then the world is well-founded 18). And so how are those disputants not insane who, though adopting from perception only the existent as distinct from 'ignorance', say that it (perception) is not negative ? And thus is established that the view is vetoed by perception.
And it is vetoed by inference, the world is not illusory, because it is different from the non-existent; like the self'. And the Middle Term 14, the 'being (merely) presented', is divergent by reason of the Brahman-Self; for that is presented, and yet not illusory. While, if it is not presented, then because of the want of use for the words applying to it, the best thing for them is dumbness. And the example 15) is deficient in the Major Term, because in regard also to the silver in a bit of shell inexpressibility 16) is established through its being included in the world.
Moreover, is this inference distinct from the world"), or non-distinct ? If distinct, then is it true or untrue? If true, then, just like it, the world also may be true, (101) because in the rampart of the Advaita doctrine there is a breach. Or, if untrue, then nothing can be established by it, because it is a non-entity. If non-distinct, then it follows that it also, having the own-nature of the world, is of illusory form; and, being of illusory form, how is it competent for the establishing of what it has to establish? And as thus the 'being of illusory form is in regard to the world unestablished, how should there be reality of the supreme Brahma, so that there should be non-existence of external objects?
Or(else) in another way there is establishment of the supreme Brahma, defined as existent only (san.mätra); and a refutation is propounded. “Surely 18), as the supreme Brahma alone exists as ultimately real in the form of affirmation, it is the object of knowledge; because there
8) Quoted also in Sammati-tarka (ed. p. 273) and Prameya-kamala-märtanda (ed. 17b): also in Nya yamalijari, p. 526. Absolute positivity of fundamental perception is a feature common to Vedānta and Buddhism.
This is not the Buddhist doctrine of a poha, which makes all names to signify negation of everything else, but the Jain notion of positivity combined with negativity, on which see infra, v. XIV, pp. 85 sq.
1) Where there is no pot. The perceptibility of negations or the alternative 'non-perception of something expected' was a standing theme of Nyāya-discussions.
1) Since absence of 'pot' is perceived. "*) of existent and non-existents. 13) I. e. not an illusion.
14) The reference is to the syllogism on p. 79. This Middle is divergent' because it disregards the instance of the Brahma-self.
15) Sil the silver in the shell (p. 79). 18) Khyāti no. 5. 17) Sc. is it a part of the world-illusion ? 18) Here commences a long statement, extending as far as p. 82.