Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 91

90
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syādvadamañjarī
Or else this whole verse is expounded in another fashion. The denotand, (115) entity, pot, etc.; in essence verily one, though of one single own-form; plural, of a plural own-form. The meaning is this: The knower, to begin with, discerns by a mark the own-form of the object of knowledge, and that realizes itself through exclusion of the congeneric and the heterogenic. For example: congeneric with pot are objects made of earth; and heterogenic are cloth, etc. Exclusion of these is the mark thereof. A particular thing with a wide-bottomed and -bellied, etc., form, tortoise-necked, adapted to the actions of carrying and bringing, etc., water, is called a pot. And the own-form of those congeneric and heterogeneric ones is in thought both superimposed upon it and excluded: because otherwise there is no accounting for the outlining of the definite own-form of it.
For the own-form of all existences consists of positivity and negativity. An entity consisting of positivity alone would be omniform; and consisting of negativity alone, it would be without own nature. Hence an entity, through existence in its own-form and through non-existence in the form of others consists of positivity and negativity: as it is said -
"Everything is in its own-form existent, and in the form of others non-existent;
Otherwise there would be a being everything (sarva-sattva), and impossibility even of own-form").
And therefore, as in a single pot all things distinct from pot occur in the form of negativity, the fact that a pot consists of plurality is easily accountable. And thus, when one object is cognized, there is cognition of all objects; because without an outlining of all things there is impossibility of outlining separately one single entity consisting of their negations. And the Scripture also is exactly so disposed -
"Whoso knows one single thing, knows everything. Whoso knows everything, knows one thing" 28). Further -
"He who has seen one single existence in all ways, By him have been seen all existences in all ways. By whom all existences have been seen in all ways,
By him one particular existence has been seen in all ways"27).
(116) But for those Buddhists who do not accept the not-being-other (parāsattva) 28), it follows that pot, etc., consist of everything. As thus: If a pot, as it has existence by its ownform etc., should be so also by the form, etc., of other, which being so, there would result, on a par with existence in its own-form, etc., existence with other form, etc.. how would it not have for essence everything? But through not-being-other that (sc. the pot) is established as definite. Or, if it is said, "The not-being-other, so far from being non-existent, is really the own-existence (of everything)', - O cleverness! Certainly that same which is existence should
35) Quoted in Pramana-mimämsä, I. i. 16, and in the commentary on Haribhadra's Sad-darśanasamuccaya, V. 46.
2) Quoted supra, p. 12.
27) Quoted supra, p. 12.
28) The reference is to the Buddhist doctrine of apoha, according to which names signify not an essence, but difference from other things: see Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 401 and Index. Apoha is criticized by Kumarila in a whole section, XIV, of the Sloka-värttika and by Jayanta in Nyaya-mañjarī, pp. 303-6 for long Jain discussion see Sammati-tarka, pp. 173, 185-223, Prameya-kamala-o, foll. 124-9. Cf. note XVI 14): In Haraprasad Shastri's Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts (pp. 1-19) is an Apoha-siddhi by Ratnakirti.