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IV. The sámkh ya doctrines
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of its previous form experience oi pleasure, pain, etc., does not deserve the name. And, if that loss takes place, there is the consequence of having activity, because of being basis of a posterior form with abandonment of a prior (form). Only by such a mutation is the arising even of an image in a crystal and so on also explained. Otherwise how is there no image in an opaque stone, etc.? And, if a mutation in that way is accepted, the thought-potency must perforce be an agent, and a direct experiencer.
Or, if it is said that 'Froin the text of Patanjali to the effect that "a non-evolving and nontransferring potency of the experiencer experiences in an object mutating and affected by transference the occurrences therein"37), this transference is merely metaphoricall; then, because metaphorical meaning has no application to the consideration of reality”28), this is to the discerning simply unacceptable. Also in that way the consciousness of pleasure and pain, which is familiar to all animates, would be altogether without basis. Nor is it proper to the Reason, since that is taken as non-intelligent. On this very ground, and Reason nonintelligent', is also contradictory: for (125) with a Reason of non-intelligent own-form ascertainment of object does not, when being argued for, improve matters. 'Surely it has been stated that Reason, although non-intelligent, appears, through the proximity of the thoughtpotency, as if possessing intelligence': - true, it has been stated, but it has been stated illogically. For in a mirror intelligence does not result when an intelligent person, etc., has been introduced into it; since intelligence and non-intelligence, having an unpervertible own nature, cannot even by Indra ?) be made otherwise. Moreover, by the expression as if in although non-intelligent, appears as if possessing intelligence superimposition (ūropa) 30) is implied. Nor is superimposition capable of practical efficacy. For, of course, a boy to whom, from being excessively liable to anger, etc., a fire-ness has been ascribed, is not at any time compeient to perform the practical actions of burning and cooking effectible by the primary fire. And so only to the thought-potency is the ascertainment of objects appropriate, and not to a Reason of non-intelligent form. On this same ground its (Reason's) having the eight forms, merit, etc., is mere verbiage; because merit, etc., are attributes of the sell. And on this same ground egoity also, as begotten from the Reason, is not logical; since that also, being, as in essence presumption, an attribute of the sell, is unsuitable for origination from a non-intelligent (thing). And that sky, etc., are sprung from the puro principles of sound atc., is answered simply by the fact that it is brushed aside by actuall presentations).
Moreover, by ali disputants, of course, without dissent, the eternality of ether is accepted. And this person, propounding a manifestation of that also from the pure principle of sound, and (yet) setting his seat on the side of the maintainers of the unequivocally eternal, appears like a disconnected chatterer. Nor should an evolving cause be a quality of its own effect; so that "ether has sound for its quality", etc., is mere verbiage. And that voice, etc., are even organs, is not logical, because they have no causality of effects that could not be brought about by something else, since we observe that the effects of demonstrating other things, apprehending them, moving them about, evacuating pollutions, etc., are effectible by other members also. If, nevertheless, that is supposed, the number of organs does not hold good, since it follows that other limbs and sub-limbs are organs. (126)
7) In Vyāsa's bhäsya on Yoga-sutra, IV. 22 (M. L.) and II. 20, this is quoted from a text of Pancasikha.
28) Source untraced. 79) The chief deity in the Rg-veda. 30) Tropa is ascription to X of a feasure which it does not possess. See N vā ya-kosa, s. v.
3) What is actually experienced. i Thomas, The Flower-Spray
