Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 90

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XIV. The Vedänta theory of the denotation of terms to the varieties of odorous substance, fine, dust, smoke, etc.; for odour-substances, etc., also in entering the nose are not seen to move the beard, grown at the portal of its cavities. The fifth, again, is unestablished; as thus: 'sound is not a quality of ether, because it is perceptible to ourselves, etc., like colour'. Thus it is established that on ground of materiality sound consists of universal and difference.
Nor should it be said, 'In regard to the self, although non-material, how is a consisting of universal and differentia incontrovertibly experienced ?" For in regard to the mundane self, which along with infinitely infinite atoms of karma 18) in their several places has fallen into an agitated state, like a mass of needles, become an undivided mass when pounded by a fireheated hammer, materiality in a way is recognized. Although to the Syād-vada-disputants every entity, material and non-material, is composed of universal and difference, nevertheless in regard to non-materials, namely support of motion 20). and rest, ether and time, the consisting of them (of universal and particular) does not to people of ordinary vision come within the sphere of such presentation, but with regard to material things that, when being argued, (114) is to them easily credible. So the materiality of sound, though beside the question, has here been adduced as a means of establishing its consisting of universal and difference.
Here also the unequivocal unity of sound, approved by the maintainers of sound as eternal. and the unequivocal plurality, adopted by the maintainers of sound as non-eternal, are to be rejected on the lines previously shown. Or else, as the denotand, pot, etc., consist of universal and differentia, the same is true of the sound (dhvani) denoting them. For an identity, in a way, of sound and object is accepted: as says Bhadrabāhu-svāminal) -
"The name (abhidhāna) is both distinct and non-distinct from the thing named; Since on the enunciation or hearing of razor, fire, sweetmeats, There is in the mouth and the ear of the one who speaks and who hears neither cutting,
nor burning, nor filling; therefore distinct. And because on the enunciation of 'sweets' there is the presentation of that only,
And not of anything else, therefore it is non-distinct from its object" 32). Hereby we have replied to -
"Sounds (words) have their source in propositions (vikal pa); the propositions have
their source in sounds; Between them is a relation of effect and cause; the sounds do not even touch the
objects" 23), Because of the text: "the notions designating things have equivalent names" 24). For of a word the real fact is this: it makes plain in its real character the thing named. And this (sound), thus making that plain, can be spoken only when developed in a development having the own-form of the thing to be named, not otherwise, because that would go too far: for at the time of mentioning a pot a mention of cloth, etc., also would come about.
**) In Jainism karma, in contrast to jiva, 'soul', is composed of matter (pudgala), which has been attracted by the soul and is the cause of the latter's 'bound', mundane, state.
30) On dharma as an eternal, ubiquitous, entity, correlate with adharma, support of rest, see Outlines of Jainism, pp. 13, 22-3, 85 and Index.
*) The celebrated, early, author of commentaries (niryukti) on Jain canonical works and of hymns (stotra).
14) Quotation not traced. *) Quoted in Devasori's commentary on Pramana-naya-tattvätoka I, 1. 4) This quotation is given only in some MSS.