Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 88

XIV. The l'edānta theory of the denotation of terms
and that is not the fact, because we see his acting in the naming of the differentia and in the business. (110) Therefore for one who aims at the differentia, and activates the business, a separate awareness apprehending it must be admitted.
Similarly one who employs the word for a differentia in the case of an universal and a word for an universal in the case of a differentia must admit in regard to the universal also a single separate awareness apprehending it. Therefore from separately shining out in a cognition apprehending each its own, both of them are mutilated. Hence, that an entity consists of universal and differentia does not fit'. Thus the doctrine of independent universal and differentia.
Now this whole triad of alternatives does not bear pressing; because it is vetoed by Demonstration'), since only an entity consisting of both universal and differentia is indisputably the thing experienced. For the mark of entity is practical efficacy: and only in the 'notunequivocal'') view do critical persons find this unimpaired. As thus: just as, when 'cow' is said, there is presented a form of entity common to all the instances, provided with hoof, hump. dewlap, tail, horn, and other parts, similarly also exclusion of buffalo, etc., is presented.
And also, where 'spotted (cow)' is said, there also, just as there is a shining forth of the differentia, so the shining forth of cow-ness also is patent. Although in 'spotted only the differentia is uttered, through the circumstances or through the context cow-ness recurs. Moreover, spottedness also is of various colours; since we see it so. Hence, when by the speaker 'spotica' is uttered, a spottedness embracing all the universal of spotted things is laid down, simply as found in the intended particular cow. While thus the fact that an entity consists of both universal and particular is familiar in presentation, down to children and herdsmen, the doctrine of both singly is mere babble. For nowhere, never, by no one is an universal deprived of the differentia experienced, or differentiae deprived of it. (111) Merely through confusion of mind arising from wrong-Method12) do foolish people, denying one, affirm one or other. This is the proverb of the blind men and the elephant 13). As for the faults mentioned above as befalling these alternatives separately, these also, being smashed to atoms by the violent stroke of the hammer of the non-equivocal doctrine, are not able even to draw a breath.
Now the maintainers of independent-universal-and-differentia are to be refuted as follows: - The universal is in the several particulars in a way distinct, in a way non-distinct, because in a way it consists of them; like dissimilar developments (pariņāma)"). For, just as a certain particular stands there, differentiated from an observed other particular, because we see a dissimilar development, so it stands out as like, because we see an universal consisting in a similar development; because of the presentation this ox is like that one', 'that is like this'. Nor is there by reason of its non-distinction from the own-form of the particular a conflict with its having the form of an universal; because colours, etc., also are non-distinct from the own-form of the particular, and there is no conflict with their being of the form of qualities. But a divergence in some respect actually exists in the similar developments, as in the caso of colour, etc.; because they possess separate designations, etc.
10) Factual experience. 11) Sc. the Jaina view, which does not absolutely distinguish the universal from the particular. 12) On this see infra. pp. 152 sq.
13) The blind men, touching severally different parts of the elephant, describe the animal variously. On this well-known simile see Col. Jacob's A handful of popular Maxims, I. p. 3.
14) Parināma is understood to be a change of state in an un hanged substrate, as when milk becomes curd. The notion was variously delined: see Nya ya-kosa, 8. v.