Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 87

86
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syädvådamanjari
has distinctionness, then there will be simply non-existence of the differentiae; because the distinctionness which is their own-form is negated, and because of the consequence of regressus ad infinitum. If one, the universal simply would be agreed to under another term; because its characteristic, the presentation of regular presence, is not lacking. Furthermore, these differentiae, are they distinct from the universal, or non-distinct? If distinct, they imitate the frog's top-knot): and, if non-distinct, they are identical therewith, like its own-form. Thus the contention of the universal solely.
Those, again, who follow the State-Method-principle state: 'Separate, momentarily perishing, differentiae alone are the ultimate reality; because an universal apart therefrom is not presented. For at the time of experiencing a particular ox, etc., nothing apart from the form of the particular, consisting of colour and configuration, shines out in the perception as one recurrent thing; because there is no experience of such. And thus they read:
"Whoso in these five fingers which appear clearly in perceptual awareness, Detects a common form, sees on his own head a horn").
'But the presentation of glimpsing (paramarsa) one single shape (akāra) arises simply from the particulars, which have a potency bestowed by their own causes. And so an establishment thereby of an universal is not reasonable.
'Furthermore, this universal which is formulated, is it single or plural? Even if single, is it omnipresent, or not omnipresent? If omnipresent, why is it not observed in the interspaces of the particulars? (109) And, if its omnipresent-unity is accepted, then, just as the universal cow-ness embraces the particular cows, why does it not similarly also the pot, cloth and other particulars? Because there is no difference. If not omnipresent, it is consequently of the form of a differentia, and the adopted view is vetoed.
'But, if plural, because differentiated by the differences cow-ness, horse-ness, pot-ness, cloth-ness, etc., then it is differentiae that are adopted; because they are causes of mutual exclusion: for that which is cow-ness is not of the essence of horse-ness. And practical efficacy is the mark of entity: and that is clearly presented only in differentiae: for by the universal no practical efficacy is exercised; because it is without action: since in the practical actions of riding, milking, etc., only the differentiae are of service. Also, is this universal distinct from the differentiae, or non-distinct? If distinct, it is non-entity; because, when it is detached from the differentiae, it has no practical efficacy; and, if non-distinct, it is only the differences, like their own-form.' So the doctrine of differentia only.
But the followers of the practical (Naigama)) Method say: 'Universal and differentia are independent; since only as such are they presented through Demonstration. As thus: universal and differentia are absolutely distinct, because they are residence of contradictory attributes; when two things are so, they are so; as water and fire: and so are these two, therefore so are they. Now the universal, ox-ness, etc., is omnipresent: and opposite thereto are the differentiae, 'brindled', 'spotted', and so forth. Hence how is their oneness logical?
*If it is said, the differentia is not to be observed apart from the universal': how then is it stated that there is observation of it? If it is said, 'as comprised by the universal'; then that is not observation of the differentia; since it apprehends also the universal. And therefore, as by that awareness there is no apprehension of the differentia as separate, the sounds stating it, and the business thereby to be effected, would not be activated by the knower;
A non-entity.
From Asoka's Samānya-düṣaṇā-dik-prasāritä (M. L.), concerning which work see Vidyabhūṣaṇa, History of Indian Logic, pp. 332-3. Haraprasad Shastri, Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, pp. 94-102. 2) On this see infra, pp. 154, 156.