Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 89

88
F. W. Thomas, Mallişena's Syadvādamañjari
The differentiae also should be absolutely apart from the universal; for, if the universal should be established as omnipresent, then, as they are not omnipresent, there would be imposition of contradictory attributes. And that is not established in regard thereto, since it has been refuted by the previously stated reasoning. For universal and differentia are affirmed as in a way mutually non-divergent in having a form single and plural. For through being non-distinct from the particulars the universal also is agreed to be plural. (112) And through non-separation from the universal the differentiae are themselves also of singular form.
And the unity of the universal is everywhere to be recognized because of its supplying the generality-Method; because of its supplying the full means of proof' it is in a way repository of contradictory attributes; for of colour in similar developments, as in dissimilar developments, there is in a way distinction, particular by particular. And so it is not established that in all ways universal and difference are repository of contradictory attributes. If being in a way repository of contradictory attributes is meant, then there is a coming over into our enclosure; because being in a way repository of contradictory attributes is inseparable from distinction in any way. And the example of water and fire is imperfect in Major and Middle; because they also are taken as only in a way repository of contradictory attributes, and as distinct. For qua water-ness and fire-ness they are repository of contradictory attributes, and distinct; but qua substance-ness, on the contrary, the opposite thereof. And so how does it not fit that an entity consists of universal and differentia ? Therefore it is well said, 'the denotand stated is single, of plural form'.
Likewise, the denotant also, called word, consists of a duality, consists of universal and differentia. In all particular words (sounds) there is a single recurrent 'sound-ness'; it is plural because of the distinction of conch-produced, horn-produced, sharp, low, acute, grave, circumflex, etc. For that sound consists of universal and differentia is patent because of its materiality; as thus: 'Sound is material because it is object of the senses, like colour, etc.'.
As for the five Middle Terms, adduced by the Yogas 18) for denying its materiality, because its basis (ether) is intangible, because of non-resistance to its entry and exit in a tightly closed place, because of non-observation of prior and posterior parts, because of not moving other small finite substances, and because of being quality of ether, these are semblances of Middle Term: as follows: the basis of the sound (word, speech)-particular (113) is the phonemeclasses, and not the ether. And in regard to them contact is actually ascertained, thus the basis of sound (speech) has contact, because it is object of sense, observed or not observed by an embodied person, when distant or near, on the windward or the leeward side; just like the atoms of substance, which are the support of scent in the same way'. So the first is unestablished. But the second is equivocal, because of divergence 18) on the part of the scent-substance: for a scent-substance, musk, etc., of a circulating kind (vart yamūna-jātyā) enters within an apartment with closed doors, and issues forth from it, and yet is not non-material.
Or, if it is said, 'In that case the closure is not very complete, because of the possibility of minute apertures, and so there is there entrance and exit of it; how otherwise does it not, as at the stage when the door is open, enter in one flood ? But in a place altogether without apertures they (the entrance and exit) are not possible', - then the Middle Term is unestablished 17, because to sound also that is common. But as for the third, it is equivocal because of lightning-flash, firebrand, etc. 18). And the fourth is the same, because of divergence in regard
15) The five are not apparent in the Nyāya or Vaiseșika sutras or bháş yas. On Yoga = Nyāya see pp. 7, 57.
"The scent-substance is an exception in respect of entry and exit. "7) The sound is not in fact entering a tightly closed place. 18) As being without prior and posterior parts, though material.