Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 84

XII. The Vedānta doctrine of Brahma as the sole reality
"Universal without differentia would be like an ass's horn:
And differentiae, from being without universal, would be just likewise" 38). Since therefore objects consisting of universal and differentia are established as the range on Demonstration, however can one supreme Brahma be within the range of the Demonstration ? As for the stated inference, because of being object of knowledge', (cf. p. 80), that also should be understood as refuted by this same; because the Minor Term being vetoed by perception, the Middle Term is belated"). As for being appearance', mentioned as Middle Term in the establishment thereof, that also, being a fallacious Middle Term, is not competent to demonstrate the Major Term in question. For is the appearance-nature of all positive existents of itself (svatah) or from others ? Not of itself, to begin with, because pot, cloth, diadem, cart, etc., are not of themselves established as being appearances: and from others a being appearance is, in default of the others, not justified.
As for all different things being said to occur as illusory appearance of the supreme Brahma, that also, inasmuch as it cannot occur without a pair, a corresponding thing in place of the thing to which it corresponds, actually prohibits a non-duality of a primeval Person. Nor are pot, etc., constantly accompanied by intelligence; since we see them constantly accompanied by earth, etc., only. Therefore this also is nothing. Hence from inference also there is no establishment of it.
Moreover, Minor Term, Middle Term, and example, which are the means of inference, are they mutually different, or non-different ? In case of difference, there is establishment of duality: in the case of non-difference, on the other hand, there is the consequence of their being of one, form. (105) Hence how does inference from these bring home the self? And, if even without a Middle Term there should be establisment of a Major Term, then how should there not be simply from words establishment of duality also ? Thus it is said 40) -
If from a Middle Term there should be establishment of non-duality, there would be
duality of the Middle and Major Terms; If without a Middle Term there is establishment, why have we not simply from words
duality ?" From Scripture, etc., also, - such as “All this is the primeval Person" "), and "All this surely in truth is Brahman"), - there is no establishment thereof. For that also, as it does not exist without duality, cannot be valid proof in regard to non-duality, because in it also we see only duality, defined as the relation of things stated and stater. Thus it is said - “Duality of deed, duality of fruition, duality of world, are contradicted;
There the pair of knowledge and ignorance would not be, likewise the pair of bondage and liberation" 3).
Hence, how is there even from Scripture establishment thereof? Therefore an entity defined as non-dual Person is not within the range of Demonstration. Thus a world is fully demonstrated. This is the meaning of the verse.
38) Kumārila's Sloka-vārtika, XIII, v. 10 (slightly altered) (M. L.), trans. p. 283. ") On this term see note VI 2).
) From Samantabhadra-svāmin's Apta-mimāmsă, v. 26 (M. L.). 1) Rg-veda, X. 90. 2 (M. L.). **) Chandogya-upanişad, TIL 14. 1 (M. L.). “) pta-mimamsä, v. 25 (M. L.).