Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 80

XIII. The Vedanta doctrine of Brahma as the sole reality
79 oceans and (at that very time) the primeval person awoke". So the sense of the saying is this, 'both will be Maya, and will be capable of effect'. Capable of effect (artha-saha), able to manifest things capable of producing effects. The word 'if' (cet) is construed here, if it is said'. Suspecting a retort thus, he calls attention to its contradiction with their own statement, in these words: then have Your Worship's opponents one who is both mother and barren? 'Kim' expresses a supposition (sambhavana); the supposition is this: Your Worship's opponents, i. e. antagonists; of those, 'Your Worship's opponents', those different from Your Worship, those disputants, as being averse to Your Worship's pronouncements; that to them one should be a mother and should be 'barren' is ridicule. (99) For it is a woman who can give birth that is called mother; and 'barren' is the opposite thereof. And so, if mother, how barren? If barren, how mother? So, if thus Maya, which is a non-entity, is accepted as capable of producing effects, the contradiction with one's own statement, as in the statement adduced, is patent. This is the general meaning.
But the detailed meaning is this: Those disputants cite as follows - 'Real is the Self-Brahma alone, according to the principle -
"All this assuredly is Brahma; diversity here there is none.
Its playground they behold, it no man beholds").
This world, on the other hand, is of illusory (mithya) form; because it is presented. What is so (sc. presented) is so (sc. illusory); as the silver in a bit of shell. And so (presented) is this; therefore so (illusory).'
Now this is mere gossip, as thus: the having an illusory form, in what way is it meant by them? Is it absolute non-existence, or the presentedness of one thing under the aspect of another, or else perhaps inexpressibility? On the first alternative we have the consequence of the appearance (khyati) 5) of the non-existent; on the second, the adoption of wrong appearance; but on the third, what is this inexpressibility?. If it is being without own-nature (niḥsvabhāvatva), then, as 'without' has the sense of negation, and the word 'own-nature' further has the sense of either positivity (bhāva) or negativity (abhava), there is the consequence of adopting appearance of the non-existent, or appearance of the existent. In case of negation of positivity, it (inexpressibility) is appearance of the non-existent; in case of negation of negativity it is appearance of the existent.
If it is said, 'Being without own-nature is not coming within the range of presentation', here there is contradiction; this world, if it is not presented, how is it taken as being a subject of attributes? And how is the state of being presented taken as a Middle Term? Or, if it is so taken, how is it not presented? If it is said, 'It is not so as it is presented', then this would be adoption by you of 'wrong appearance"). Moreover, this inexpressibility of the world is vetoed by perception. For perception, which is in the mode of 'this pot', etc., (100) certifies actually the truth (satyata) of the world; since it originates with the character of outlining definite things, such as pot, etc.; and since only mutually distinct entities are designated by the word 'world' (prapanca)").
The quotation seems to be composite, 'All this... Brahma' being from Chandogya-upanisad III. 14. 1, Diversity... none' from Brhadaranyaka-upaniṣad, IV. 6. 19, 'Its playground...' from the same, IV. 3. 14. But on p. 82 the whole is quoted as from Scripture having an author!
*) On the five khyätis, views concerning 'appearance' (1) atma-kh. appearance based on the absolute Self; (2) asat-kh., appearance of what is non-existent; (3) an yatha-kh., appearance of an existent as it is not; (4) akh., non-appearance of an existent, (5) anirvacaniyakh., appearance inexpressible) see Randle, Indian Logic in the early schools, pp. 59 sq., Dasgupta, H. N., History of Indian Philosophy, II, 87, n., III, 183-4.
1. e. anyatha-khyāti (3) instead of your anirvacaniya-khyāti (5). ") As a system of differing things.