Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 42

VIII. The categories of the Vaiseșikas and in comparison with thai 'blueness', etc.; similarly, from occurrence in (43) the five actions, 'action' is an universal, and as separate from substance and qualities it is a difference; similarly, in comparison with 'action-ness, should 'elevation', etc., be understood.
As to these, on what reasoning is 'existence a thing (artha) other than substance, quality, action?"") - if that is asked, it is said: "Existence is not substance, 'is different froin substance' is the meaning; 'because of belonging to the single substance' 10), - because of 'occurring in each several substance is the meaning; like substance-ness. As substance-ness, occurring in the 9 substances severally, is not a substance, but substance-ness simply, defined as 'universality-difference', so also 'existence'. For to the Vaišeşikas what has no substance (parts) is a substance, or what has plural substance (parts) is a substance. Of these the substances which have not substances 11) are ether, time, direction, sell, intellect, atoms; but plural substance is masses (skandha), from diatoms upwards. Again, what has one substance is not substance at all; and existence has one substance, and so, from having a mark different from the mark of substance, it is not substance. And similarly 'existence is not quality, because it is found (bhāvād) in qualities, like quality-ness. For, if 'existence' were a quality, then it would not occur in qualities, because qualities are without quality 12); but 'existence' does occur in qualities, because of the presentation existent quality'. Furthermore, 'existence' is not action; because it is in actions, like action-ness. And, if existence' were action, then it would not occur in actions, because actions are without action 3); but 'existence' does occur in actions, because of the presentation existent action. Therefore 'existence is a separate category".
"Likewise, the differences, ultimate (antyā) as occurring in the eternal substances, are the causes of absolute (atyanta) separateness. These (i. e. the differences), because of their dissimilarity (vailaksan ya) from substance, etc., are a separate category, and to this effect Praśāstakāra says!):
"As found (bhavā) in the ultimates they are ultimate, because they differentiate their locus, they are difference. Occurring in eternal substances, which are without destruction or composition, namely atoms, ether, time, direction, self and intellect singly, in each several substance, they are the causes of the awareness of absolute separateness. (44) As for us and the like, a separation of presentation from horses, etc., is exemplified in regard to oxen, etc., caused by (nimitta) equivalent shape, quality, action, growth of parts, difference of parts and union of parts, - (and we have this presentation) ox, white, swiftly moving, stout, humped, with a large bell, ---- likewise to Yogins, our superiors, in regard to the eternal atoms, equal in shape, quality and action, and in regard to liberated selves and intellects, the means indications) whereby, because of the impossibility of other means, there is separateness of presentation with respect to every instance (bearer), to the effect that this one is different, this one is
V.-sutra, I. ii. 7-10. This peculiarity of the Vaišesika doctrine of "Existence' (sattā) has the effect of excluding Universals, Particularities, and Inherence, which nevertheless are regarded as reals. Possibly the basic idea was that of practical efficacy' (artha-kriya-käritva), which was the Buddhist conception and was also in a way accep able to the Jains (see infra p. 155): satta is discussed in Sammati-tarka, pp. 110-1. It will be observed, further, that 'relation' is in Indian Logic not a category, most physical relations being included in Quality
10) The reference may be to V.-sütra, I. ii. 27. 11) I. e. may have no parts; V.-sutra.
**) This (highly questionable)' uiseșika doctrine (V.-sutra VII ii. 25) is perhaps partly explicable by the character and limited number of the qualities (guna): Attributes in general are designated by a different term (dharma).
13) V.-sutra, VII. ii. 24. The Indians do not seem to have had the notion of 'acceleration: 1) In his bhūş ya on the V.-sütra, c. VIII, text p. 156, trans. Gangänāth Jha, p. 671.