Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 61

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F. W. Thomas, Mallişeņa's Syadvadamenjari
knowledge, since it is the knower. And sense-organs, awareness and intellect, as being instruments, are not subjects of knowledge. Faults, again, are passion, aversion, delusion; and these cannot be apart from activity 23); since operation of voice 24), intellect and body, of 20 kinds 25), with fruit good and bad, are in their view to be designated by the word 'activity' 26) and since faults, passion, etc., are essentially operations of intellect.
As to pain, and sound, etc., the objects of the senses, there is inclusion in fruit: because of the statement by Jayanta that “Begotten by activity and faulta?), and consisting of pleasure and pain, is the primary fruit; but the means (sādhana) thereto are metonymously so". State after death and beatitude, again, being of the form of assumption (apatti) by the self simply of another development, cannot properly be mentioned separately from the self. And so the statement that subjects of knowledge are of 12 kinds is merely expansion in speech, while the proper definition is: "Entities, consisting of substance and states, are the subject of knowledge": because it comprises all. Likewise that doubt, etc.28), are semblances of truth, should not be overlooked by discerning persons: but here, because of familiarity (pratitatva) and from fear of longwindedness, it is not worked out. For in this connection the Nyāyaśāstra would have to be introduced entire; and, if introduced, that embarks upon another book separately; - so let that pass.
While so the 16 categories, means of knowledge, etc., are without distinction semblances of truth, only the three, sophistry, vagueness, and censure-situation, which work the puppets in the play of open cheating, have been adduced in the expression through delusion teaching". As regards these: attack on the statement of an opponent by supporting an alternative meaning is sophistry. This is of three kinds 28), verbal sophistry, sophistry of the universal, metonymy sophistry. (72) Of these, when a common word has been used, denial of it by supposing something other than the speaker's intent is verbal sophistry. For example: when it is said, 'This boy has a new (nava) blankef', the opponent attributes number, and denies it, saying: 'How has he nine (nava) blankets?' When an universal, although conceivably going too far, is proffered, a denial of it by attributing to it the status of Middle Term is the sophistry of the universal. As: In a context of praising a Brāhman, saying: 'Ah! surely that Brahman perfect in knowledge and conduct', someone says, 'In a Brāhman perfection of knowledge and conduct is presumed'; then the sophistical disputant in regard to it, attributing to Brahmanhood the value of a Middle Term, rejoins in refutation: 'If in a Brāhman there is perfection of knowledge and conduct, let that be the case with a Vrātya, even a Vrätya is actually a Brāhman'. In case of a metonymous use of countering by denying the primary meaning is meton ymy-sophistry. As, when it is said, 'The benches cry out', the opponent counters with:
How can the unthinking benches cry out? It is the people on the benches who cry out!"
Again, when a correct Middle Term, or a semblance of a Middle Term, has been used by a disputant, immediately, without it being realized whether it is faulty or real, some counterstatement or other, generally involving a reflex (pratibimba) of the Middle Term 30), that is vagueness; semblance of refutation, that is the meaning. And that is, through the distinction
11) In N.-sutra, 1. i. 17, pravrti is defined as energizing (arambha) with voice, mind (or) body: in Indian philosophy it seems always to connote will. ..^) N.-sutra, I. i. 17.
*) Sc. 10 good and 10 evil: see Nya ya-vārttika on sütra I. i. 17. 18) See note 24). *7) From Jayanta's Nya ya-mañjari (ed. pp. 504-5) (M. L.), based on N.-sutra 1. i. 20. *8) This may allude to the discussion of doubt in N.-sütra, II. i. 18. **) Expounded in N.-sutra, I. ii. 10-17. *) 'Reflex of the Middle Term': The counter-proposition is in form a copy of that which it opposes.