Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 77

F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syādvādamañjarī
knower's aim (artha) is satisfied upon the establishment of the object (artha) by the mere originating of the cognition ascertaining the object; and, if there is a desire to know the cognition of the object, a cognition does arise in regard to that also'.
This is illogical, because, as the (alleged) Minor 1) (pakṣa) is vetoed by a contrary inference, the Middle Term comes too late 16). As thus: The cognition which is the subject of dispute is self-conceived; because it is a cognition, like God's cognition. Nor is this example unaccepted by disputants; because, as the Jains also admit a special person as a God, his cognitions are to them a well-established thing.
And also your Middle Term here has a purposeless (vyartha) noun (viseşya) 17); because, the Major Term being established simply by the assumption of a meaningful (samartha) attribute (visesana), (96) as in the establishment of fire because, given the having smoke, there is a being substance, the case is satisfied simply through (this Middle Term) 'being other than God's cognition'. For other than God's cognition, there is no cognition self-conceived and not a subject of knowledge, for the exclusion of which 'through being a subject of knowledge' should be said; because on Your Worship's view all cognition other than that is a subject of knowledge (knowable).
Also this Middle Term is non-conclusive, because it is subject to a condition (upadhi) 18); for of course what is termed a condition is that which does not comprehend the Minor Term and has equal comprehension with the Major Term; as in the case of the being a development of a vegetarian diet, when dark complexion is to be proved by being the son of so and so, etc.; (because the sons of Mitra, if they feed [in the womb] on vegetables, are dark; so that his 'being son of Mitra' is not a proof that he is dark.) And the condition in the present case is 'being not intelligent': as thus: Only that which, being also other than God's cognition and subject of knowledge, is unintelligent, i. e. a pillar, etc., that alone is illuminated by something other than itself. For dependence upon another for own-illumination is the definition of 'non-intelligent': and a cognition is not of a non-intelligent own-form. Hence the being non-intelligent is not comprehensive of the Middle Term 10): and its having the same extension as the Major Term is patent; because we nowhere see the absence of self-illumination except in non-intelligence, or non-intelligence apart from that (i. e. absence of illumination).
As for it having been said, 'For a cognition (already) originated, inherent in the same self""), and so on, that also is not true. Since we do not see that the cognition of the object, and the cognition of that (cognition), when they originate, have such order of succession. If it is said, "The non-observation of order is due to rapid originating, like the opening of the hundred leaves of a blue lotus', this is not so, since one propounds the originating of the cognition of the object as after interposition of a desire to cognize 21). Nor does the production of cognitions by a desire to cognize fit; because in regard to objects suitably placed, even if there is no desire to cognize them, we have a presentation of the originating thereof (i. e. the cognitions). Nor has the cognition of the object an unsuitable location; (97) since it is produced as inherent
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15) The supposed un-self-conscious cognition.
16) On 'belated' Middle Terms see note VI 2).
17) Subject of knowledge': this is superfluous for the reason to be stated; just as in the case of fire 'a being substance' is superfluous.
18) Condition is something which restricts the extension of the Middle Term so far as this is covered by the Major, so that there are outside eccurrences which may not fall under the Major: hence the Middle Term does not prove the Major. This topic and the example of Mitra's sons are commonplaces in Indian Logic: see Nyayakośa, s. v. Upadhi.
19) Sc. 'being non-intelligent': some objects of cognition are not non-intelligent. 20, See p. 75 below.
There is therefore an interval.