Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 47

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F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvādamañjarī
them have awareness (avabodha) of the object. And, as in a pot the colours, etc., are inherent by the inherence-connection, and upon their destruction there is destruction also of their support, the pot, similarly cognition also is inherent in the self; and that (cognition) is momentary 37); hence upon its destruction the self's destruction results; so its non-eternality is the result.
Or else let there be connection of cognition and self by inherence; but that same inherence, whereby is it connected with them? If it is said by another inherence', regressus ad infinitum. If it is said, of itself simply', why is it not so as regards cognition and the self? Or, if it is said that 'Just as a lamp, through that being its own-nature, illuminates itself and others, so the own-nature of inherence is such that it conjoins itself, and also cognition and self", why have not cognition and self also a suchwise own-naturedness that simply of themselves the two are connected? Furthermore, the example of the lamp also does not fit in with Your Worship's alternative; for a lamp, to begin with, is a substance, and illumination is an attribute of it, and by you an absolute separation of attribute and bearer of attributes is approved; so how has a lamp the own-nature (almakata) of illumination? And in the absence thereof the talk of its having the own-nature of illuminating itself and others is simply baseless.
And, if, even with absolute separation of the illumination from the lamp, the lamp's illuminating itself and others is agreed to, then that applies also to the pot, etc.; because there is no difference in the separateness. Moreover, those two own-natures of combining self and other, would they be different from inherence, or not different? If different, then how can there be the connection that has these two own natures', since, from fear of regressus ad infinitum, another inherence as a bond of the connection is not accepted? But, if not different, then we have inherence merely, and not those two, because, like its own-nature, they are not separate from it. Furthermore, if it is said, 'As the thought (mati), "in these inherence-bearers there is inherence" is justified (51) even without (another) inherence, so is also the presentation "in this self is cognition", even without that (i. e. inherence)', we say: then what fault is there?
Then, if it is said: 'The self is an agent, cognition an instrument 38); difference of agent and instrument is patent, like that of carpenter and axe; so how can there be non-distinction of cognition and self?', - Not so! Because of dissimilarity of example. For an axe is an external instrument, and cognition internal: so how can there be similarity of the two? Nor is such a twofoldness of instruments unestablished. As the Lakṣanikas") say:
"Instrument is to be understood, by the wise, as twofold, external and internal; As 'he mows with a sickle, he goes to Meru by thought'" 40).
For, if some internal instrument, unequivocally distinct (from the self), is shown, then there might be similarity between the example and the thing exemplified; but there is no such. Nor can every attribute found in external instruments be associated with an internal one; otherwise also in 'Devadatta sees with lamp for eye' there would be unequivocal difference of Devadatta from his eye, as from the lamp; and, that being so, there would be contradiction of world-wide presentation.
37) As are all the special qualities of the soul: see note VIII 22).
39) In the V.-sutra the conception of cognition as an instrument is not apparent; but in the Prasastapāda bhāṣ ya (p. 44, trans. p. 152) this is said of the sense-organs and the mind-organ (manas), and the axe also is mentioned.
39) Apparently only 'definers', no distinct group being intended. The doctrine of the two kinds of karana (instrument) is ascribed in the Nyaya-kosa to the Samkhya.
40) Source of quotation untraced.