Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 49

48
F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvādamañjari
absence of the junction with intelligent-ness (caitenya) that it (i. e. the pot) has not that presentation', - No! Because that even an unintelligent thing, through union with intelligentness, can believe (prati palli) 'I am intelligent' has just been rejected; thus the being nonintelligent, when established, does away with outlining of objects by the self, if unthinking
jada). And one who approves of that (i. e. outlining, etc.), must accept its having intelligentness for own-form..
"Surely, because of the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition there is distinction of self and cognition, because otherwise from the presentation 'I am possessed of wealth also a non-distinction of wealth and wealthy would follow". That is wrong. For, on your view, the self does not have the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition', because its nature is unequivocally non-thinking, like a pot. But do not infer that 'the self might be altogether unthinking, and yet have the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition', as there is no contradiction', since that cannot possibly arise so. For the presentation 'I am possessed of cognition' never arises in regard to the quality called cognition if unapprehended, and in regard to self as bearer of the quality: because of contradiction to your own view: for it is stated that without apprehension of the quality there is no awareness of the thing qualified" 44).
If it is said, 'It does arise in regard to the two when apprehended45), whence is the apprehension of them ? Not, to begin with, from the cognition) itself (svatah), because self-consciousness (sva-sanwedanā) is not admitted 4). In regard to the se!f-known self, and in regard to the cognition, that (apprehension) is logically from itself; not otherwise, as in the case of a different series (santāna) "7. And, if from another (cognition), that other cognition also, as a thing qualified, cannot be apprehended without apprehension of the quality, cognition-ness (jñānalva). (54) For, il after apprehension of pot-ness apprehension of the pot is to be realized by apprehension thereof from another cognition, there is regressus ad infinitum, and how do we have the proposed presentation ? Therefore, the self's being of a non-intelligent form does not fit; and, as that does not fit, 'intelligentness dependent on conditions and other than the self' is mere words.
Further, as to the inference stated 48 to prove that Moksa is not composed of consciousness and bliss, because of these) being a series' 48), in regard to that we say: 'Surely, is this being a series' something independent, or merely origination of objects in succession, or origination in succession on one single basis? Of these the first alternative has exceptions, because things which arise in succession, like pots, cloths, mats, etc., even if they are serial, are not absolutely annihilated 5): but, if the second alternative, then, since 'such a seriality 50) is lacking in lamp-light', we have an example wanting the Middle Term 52). And the Middle Term has deviation 5), because of the colour of atoms due to heat, etc., because despite the existence (sadbhava) therein of such a seriality (i. e. a series on the same basis) there is no absolute annihilation. Moreover, there may be both seriality, and also no absolute annihilation, because there is no vetoing proof to the contrary, and so this (Middle Term) is equivocal'
44) Quoted in Sammat-carta, pp. 84 574, etc. 48) Sc. the self and cogmtion. 48) Sc. by the Vaiseşikas as a factor in all cognition. On this much discussed topic see infra, p. 73 sq.
+7) The word santāna is here used in the Buddhist sense, which substitutes for a permanent Ego a series of thoughts. The meaning here is some other person'.
48) See p. 43. ") And therefore having an end. 56) See p. 43. 51) A series which comes to an end. 52) Sc. coming to an end'. The lamp-light was instanced on p. 43. 54) Vyabhicära of a Middle Term is ils occurrence in instances lacking the Major (Nyaya-sutra, 1. j. 4-5).