Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 56

IX. The Vaiseșika views about the side of the atman
55 space-atoms (also) the term 'parts' is used; but as to being a product we shall (now) speak.
If it is said, 'Surely, if the selves are products, like pot, etc., there is the consequence of their being constituted of previously actual homogeneous (congeneric) parts; for parts constitute the thing with parts, just as threads a cloth', -- This should not be said. Even in products such as pots, etc., we do not see a being constituted by conjunction of previously actual congeneric potsherds; since what is presented is its origination, in the first instance. in the form of something with a broad bottom and belly, from a lump of clay invested with the operation (vyā pāra) of the potter, etc. For being a product is the development of a later aspect in a substance with abandonment of a former aspect, and that (64) is actually experienced internally as well as externally; and in that way the self also may be a product. Nor from the observation in regard to a cloth that it is a product preceded by conjunction of its parts is the so being (tathābhāva) everywhere logical; for it would follow from the observation of an iron mark on wood that it should be just so (tathā-bhāva) with adamant; the vetoing by proof is in both cases alike. Nor, even if productness, with the stated definition, is admitted, is there, from the consequent non-eternality of the self, the consequence of default of recollection (pratisandhāna); because, even if there is in some way non-eternality, this is accountable. For recollecting is in the form 'whom I saw, him I remember', etc.: and how, in case of unequivocal eternality, is that accountable'? Because of difference of state: for the state of experience is one, and the state of recollection is another; and, when there is difference of state, from the difference also of what is in the state, the singleness of form is impaired. Non-eternality in some way, which logically presents itself, what is to bar?
If it is said, 'Well then, if the sell is of the size of the body, then, because of the consequence of finitude, it could not penetrate the body because of the contradiction in penetration of a finite by a finite; so it results (prāpnoti) that the whole body is without a self (nirātmaka)', - What is this finitude, forsooth? Is it having the size of a non-omnipresent substance, or is it having colour, etc.? Of these the first alternative is not an objection, because a matter of consent. The second, however, is illogical, because there is no comprehension (vyāpti) ?). For there is no inseparability such that 'what is not omnipresent is by rule (niyamena) possessed of colour, etc.'; because in regard to the intellect (manas) 18, though not omnipresent, that is, in your opinion, not the case. Since it is stated that ether, time, direction and self 18) have omnipresence, supreme magnitude, and collocality with all things which have conjunction, intellect, as being differently qualified, is denied omnipresence. Hence it is not unaccountable that the self should penetrate the body, so that that should be without a self, since finitude, defined as non-omnipresent-substance-size, is no obstacle to its penetrating, like intellect (manas). Water, etc., though possessed of finitude defined as having colour, etc., are not forbidden to penetrate into sand, etc.; (65) and that the self, though without that (finitude), should be prevented therefrom, is very surprising.
"Well, if the self has the size of the body, how could it, when of the size of a child's body, take on the size of a young man's body? Is it by abandonment of that size, or by not abandoning the same ? Il by abandonment, then in consequence of its being non-eternal, like the body, there is the consequence of its having no other (future) world. If by non-abandonment, that does not do; because, with the non-abandonment of the earlier size, there is, as in the case of the body, no accounting for origination in it of the later size', -- that is illogical: because
17) Inclusion of a Middle Term in the Major. 18) In the V.-sutra (see TIL ii. 1-3) this is atomic, not omnipresent: it is, of course, colourless. 19) See Prasastapäda's bhāsya, trans, Ganganath Jha, p. 54.