Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 43

42
F. W. Thomas, Mallişena's Syadvāda mañjari
different', and whereby in regard to an atom remote in place and time there is the recognition, this is the same', - is the ultimate differences".
"And these have the form of differences only 15), and are not, like substance-ness, and so on, of the form of both universal and difference, because they are causes of separation only.
"Further, inherence is the connection which is the cause of the presentation' here 'in regard to inseparables (a-yuta-siddha), which are respectively locus and thing located.' Between two inseparables which have not with mutual avoidance location in separate locuses, this status of locus and thing located, which is the non-common (special) cause 16) of the presentation 'in these threads the cloth', etc., is inherence. That in virtue whereof a located thing, such as cloth, etc., when coming into existence by the force of its own causes (kārana), is united with its locus, i. e. the threads, etc., like the action of cutting with the thing to be cut, that also, because of difference (vaidharmya) of mark from substance, etc., is a separale category. And so there are six categories.
"Now the syllabic (verbal) sense is expounded: 'Of existents even', etc.; of existents even, - i. e. among the six categories also which are common insofar as knowable by awareness of 'existent'; only in some case, only in some categories; existence, the use of the universal; there would be, would have place, not in all. To those (cases, categories) applies the linguistic expression 'existent' (sad); for, since it is stated that 'in substance, quality and action is that, existence (sattā)'1?', wherever there is the presentation existent', there only is there 'existence'. And the presentation 'existent' applies only to substance, quality, and action; hence only to those does 'existence' apply, and not to the triad of categories, universality, etc.; because that (expression existent') is (in their case) lacking. What is asserted is this: Although is-ness (astitva) 18), wich is the own-form of an entity, is found also in the triad universality, etc.; nevertheless it does not cause a presentation of their conformity (anuvptii); only what is presentation of conform recurreace, (45) is presentation of existent'; and because of absence of that there is no application of existence to those (three). But in the triad, substance, etc., on the other hand, both 'is-ness', as the own-form of an entity, common to the six categories. is found, and also there is connection with existence, as cause of the presentation of conformity; for in 'hare's horn', which has no own-form, there is no inherence of existence.
"If it is asked, 'How is there no presentation of conform recurrence in regard to the triad, universal, etc. ?', we reply: Because of the existence (sad-bhāvāl) of precluding circumstances. As thus: if we agree to the application of existence to 'existence', we have regressus ad infini. tum; if, again, we accept it in regard to differences', there is defeasance of their own-form, which is marked (defined) as being cause of separation'; if we suppose it in regard to inherence, there is no connection; for by what connection is existence connected therewith ? - since there is no other inherence. And to this effect Udayana, the prince of logicians:
“Non-uistinction of instance, equivalence, confusion (mixture), then regressus ad
infinitum,
Defeasance of character (rūpa), non-connection, sum up what vetoes genus""). "So it stands fast that of existents even there would be existence only in some cases".
15) They are strictly individual and do not constitute a class: V.-sutra, I. ii. 6.
16) The Adjective has the object of excluding causes, such as God's cognition, which are common to all effects.
17) On the restriction of existence (salta) to these see note 9.
18) This, defined in the Nyā ya-kosa as connection with time', may perhaps be rendered by 'actuality': it may serve to exclude the merely possible, the false, etc.
") From Udayana's Kiraņāvali, Dravya section, p. 161 (M. L.).