Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 26

V. The Vaiseșika doctrine of eternality and non-eternality attributes. And so these, being non - different from their bearer, are through its eternity eternal, and through their difference they are spheres of origination and destruction. And so both are accounted for.
Now he expounds the second half. Although it is thus proved that all existences have origination, destruction and permanence for their self-essence, nevertheless they say: that. i. e. entity, in one case, as ether, the self, etc., is simply eternal, and in another, a lamp, pot, etc., it is simply non-eternal: in this way the word 'simply' (eva) is supplied here also. Now so a wrong-Method contention is the result. For it is the mark of wrong-Method) that, while prone to justify the attributes of eternity, etc., of which they approve in regard to entities which in their essence have an infinite number of attributes, they proceed to ignore the remaining attributes. Thus, on these lines, - of the foes of Thy precepts, i. e. of the opponents of the doctrines developed by Thee, - the chatterings, the babblings, disorderly sentences. That is what it comes to.
And here, despite the first mentioning, "Down to the lamp', etc., of the non-eternity alternative as familiar with the opponents, subsequently, when with disregard to order 'in one simply eternal' was put first, that intimates as follows: what is non-eternal, that also is actually in a way eternal, and what is eternal, that is also actually in a way non-eternal; because even advanced disputants admit in regard to earth, although it is actually one, both eternity and non-eternity. And so says Praśastakāra: "And this is twofold, eternal and non-eternal; defined as atoms eternal, but defined as products non-eternal" 13).
Nor should it be said that here, because of the difference of the two objects (vişaya), defined ag atoms and produced substances, eternality and non-eternality are not collocal (nai kādhikaranam): because earthness in both cases is not wanting. This also they stated: in ether also, because of admitting conjunction and separation, these people logically accepted noneternality. And to this effect the same person (20) said: “Through the statement of its being cause of sound it has conjunctions and separations" 14): and so we have a combination of the alternative of eternality and non-eternality. And this was even in part realized.
And that the doctrines of the other schools are mainly chatterings is to be justified as follows: To begin with, the mark of an entity is production of a result (artha-kriya-käritva) 15). And, on the alternative of complete eternality, or complete non-eternality, that does not fit. For the eternal is what is unfailing (unlost), unoriginated, permanent, uniform. And this would produce results either by stages, or all at once; because as to things which have the form of mutual exclusion there is no possibility of any other mode (prakāra).
And here, to begin with, not by stages. For it would perforce perform, at the time of the first action, the actions which are to be at another time; since it is illogical for what is capable to postpone the time. Or, if postponing in time, it is chargeable with incapability. If it is said that even the capable effects such and such a thing upon intervention of such and such accessories, then it is not capable, because its functioning requires another co-operant. For the logical maxim is, "what requires is not capable"16).
"") The nayas as one-sided methods of approach and the wrong-nayas, those which also overlook their one-sidedness: see the full statement infra vv. XXVII-VIII, pp. 149 sq.
13) Praśastakära (more usually cited as Prasastapāda, on which matter see Gangānăth Jhā, trans. of his bhāsya, Introd, p. 11), in his bhāsya on the Vaiseşika-sutra, trans. p. 66
*) Prasastapāda's bhäsya, trans. p. 129.
18) Practical efficacy (artha-kriya-kāritva), a criterion of existence specially upheld by Buddhists, but accepted by the Jains also: see infra p. 155. Professor Dhruva points out (Notes, p. 68) that this whole passage (pp. 25-26) on artha-kriya is based upon Hemacandra's Pramana-mimamsă, I. i. 33 (Comm. pp. 40-2).
19 No. 28 (p. 77) in Hemahamsa Ganin's collection from Hemacandra's Grammar (M. L.).