Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 35

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F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syādvadamañjarī
for that would be inference or verbal communication. Not inference, to begin with, since that is preceded by the recollection of the connection of a thing marked with the mark (linga): and in regard to his omniscience as the thing to be inferred, we do not see any unfailing mark, since owing to his infinite distance there can be no apprehension of connection with a mark attached to him'.
And, if it is said: 'The diversity of the world, unaccountable without omniscience on his part, is a practical proof of his omniscience', - Not so: because there is no indispensability, since the diversity of the world is not unaccountable without his omniscience. For the world is twofold, (33) because of the difference between stationary and mobile. Among these, the diversity in the mobile is due simply to the force of the maturing of self-accumulated, pure and soiled, action (karma); in the stationary, however, as regards creatures with mentality the same is the case; while the diversity of those without mentality 18) is established since beginningless time as means to their suitability for being experienced by the former.
Nor is Scripture proof of it (omniscience). For this would be composed either by him, or by others. And if, while composed by him, it proves his omniscience, then there is a weak point in his greatness: for proclaiming by oneself of one's own qualities is not contemplated (adhikṛta) of the great. And another thing: it is not even logical that he should compose a śāstra; for a sastra consists of sounds; now these are produced by the operation of the palate, etc., and that is possible only in a body; and on the supposition of his having a body there are the previously stated faults. If it (the Scripture) is composed by another, that other is either omniscient or not omniscient. If omniscient, then through the resultant duality, the previously stated supposition of his unity is put out of court; and in the discussion of the proof which establishes his existence there is the objection of a regressus ad infinitum. And, if he is not omniscient, what trust is there in his teaching?
And another thing: the Scripture approved by Your Worship, actually establishes its author's non-omniscience, because it contains contradictions between former and later statements. For example, having first said, "He should not hurt any living beings" 1"), afterwards, in the same work, it is read,
"six hundred animals on the middle day of the Horse-sacrifice 20) are scripturally enjoined, less three animals".
And further, "Let him lay hands on an animal for the Agnisoma"21, "Let him lay hands on seventeen animals for Prajapati" 22), etc., how possibly do these and the like passages not carry contradiction between former and later? Further, having first by, "Let him not speak what is untrue" 23), etc., prohibited false speaking, (34) afterwards we have, "For the sake of a Brahman he may speak what is untrue" 24), etc. Also:
18) According to a prevalent indu notion the material cosmos is so ordained as to provide recompense for the actions of living beings. In the case of theism this may be regarded as 'providential', while for illusionists who conceived of self-imagined hells, etc., there was no difficulty. The Jains, who admit no deity, and for whom merit and demerit are material conditions, do not seem to have dwelt upon the idea of retribution.
1) Chandogya-upaniṣad, VIII (M. L.).
20) A verse quoted in Gaudapada's commentary on the Samkhya-kärikā, and in Mahidhara-Bhasya on Yajus Samhita Adh. 24.
21) Aitareya-brähmana, VI. 3 (M. L.). (Agnisoma ritual connected with the divinities Agni and Soma.) 22) Satapatha Brahmana. V. i. 3. 7. Taittiriya Samhita I 4. (M. L.).
23) Untraced.
24) pastamba. (Dhruva).