Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 34

VI. The Vaisesika doctrine of a world-creator God
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etc., the possibility of a considerable waste of time, there may be non-completion even with a substantial time. On the second alternative, we do not see the slightest objection even to his occupying a specified place, while contriving the products merely by thought, because even with ordinary divinities occupying definite places we accept the creation of such and such products simply by thought.
Moreover, if his omnipresence is agreed, it follows that he occupies even impure places, hells, etc., with deep darkness: and so an undesired consequence. And, if it is said that, 'On your alternative also, when it is said that with his cognition-self he comprehends the whole Three Worlds, then, since we presume that he perceives the taste of impure savours, and since it follows that he has himself experience in the form of pains of hell, etc., the undesired consequence is the same (for both of us)'; - then that is like one unable to rejoin by arguments. sprinkling dust on you. For cognition, which acts without reaching (a-prapya-kari), outlines (paricchinatti) its object (visaya) even while remaining in its own place, and not by going to it; (31) so how is Your Honour's criticism right? For on Your Honour's part also there is not through the mere cognition of an impure thing, experience of the flavour of its taste; because, if it were so, since enjoyment would be effected merely by the thinking of sandal wood, woman, wine (rasavati), superfluity of the effort to get them would follow.
With regard, however, to what was said previously, i. e. that, if his omnipresence is with his cognition-self, 'we have an establishing of what is already established', that must be meant only potentially. And it is thus that speakers say, "His mind flows through all the sastras". And cognition acts without reaching; because, being an attribute of the self, it does not issue outside. And, if it did issue outside, then, since the self would be without intelligence, absence of soul would result: for an attribute has never been seen anywhere by itself, extending beyond its bearer. As for the example adduced by the opponents (the other side), i. e. just as the sun's rays, though of the form of qualities, come forth from the sun and illuminate the world, so cognition also, issuing forth from the soul, outlines the object (prameya), to this the reply is, 'That the rays are qualities is unproved, because, as consisting of the matter of light, they are substances; and, as for their quality, consisting of illumination, that exists never apart from them'. And so in the Dharma-samgrahani Sri-Haribhadra, the revered acārya1), says -
"Rays are qualities, not substances: their illumination is a quality, not substance. Cognition, which is a quality of the self, how is that, not being a substance, elsewhere? (370)
Cognition, without going out, outlines the thing to be cognized in the place where it is;
Though abiding in the self, it must none the less be understood to have infinite potencies. (371)
The potency of the magnet, even while residing in itself,
Is visible in its effects, attracting the iron, though in another place. (372)
If similarly here also the potency of cognition, even while residing in the self,
Rightly outlines, mark me, the ends of the universe, what contradiction should there be here?" (373), and so on. (32)
And, if 'omnipresent' has been explained as 'all-knowing', in regard to that also there is a rejoinder: 'Surely, by what proof is his omniscience apprehended? By direct perception, or indirectly? Not by perception, to begin with, because that, as arising from contact of senseorgan and thing (artha), is incapable of apprehending the supersensory. Nor again indirectly:
17) Dharma-samgrahani, vv. 370-3 (M. L.).
3 Thomas, The Flower Spray