Book Title: Syadvada Manjari
Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

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Page 27
________________ 26 F. W. Thomas, Mallisena's Syadvadamañjari II it is said: 'Not by it are the co-operants required, but the effect itself, non-existent so long as the co-operants do not exist, requires them, then is that existent incapable or capable ? If capable, why does it tolerate their humble looking to co-operants, and not immediately bring them to pass ? "Surely, though capable, the seed produces the shoot only when accompanied by the co-operants, such as earth, water, wind, etc., and not otherwise". Well then, would it be helped at all by the co-operants, or not? If it would not be helped, then why is it not then also, just as before the presence of the co-operants, indifferent lo producing the effect? If it would be helped, then it should be stated whether the help rendered by them is non-separate or separate. If non-separate, it is that itself (21) that is rendered. And so, while wishing for profit, you lose your capital, because as being a product it incurs non-elernity. Il separate, however, how is there a helping of it? Why not also on the part of the Sahya and Vindhya mountains ? If it is said that, in consequence of connection with it, the one belongs to the other, what is the connection (sambandha) between the assisted and the assistance? It is not, to begin with, conjunction (sam yoga), because that exists only in the case of two substances, and in the present case the thing to be assisted is a substance, and the assistance is an action; so there is no conjunction. Nor is it inherence (samavāya); because, as that is single and all-embracing and, being without nearness and distance, equivalent everywhere, a connection of it with specific connecteds is not logical. And, if we agree to a connection with specific connecteds, then the assistance rendered to it must be admitted to be on the part of inherence. And, that being so, the hypothesis of the separation and non-separation of the assistance is in the same position as before. And, if there is no separation of the inherence from the assistance, the inherence itself would be a product. And in case of separation, once more we have not inherence as connection with specific connecteds. So then an unequivocally eternal existent does not produce results by stages. Nor, again, not by stages. For it is obvious that a single existent thing does not all at once perform all actions which belong to the mass of all particles of time. Or let it do so; all the same what is it to do in the second instant ? If it does, there is the fault which arises on the alternative of successive production; if, however, it does not, then, because of the negation of efficacy, it follows that it is a non-entity. And so, as comprised by successiveness or nonsuccessiveness, an efficacy on the part of the unequivocally eternal being, by force ot the nonexistence of the compriser, dismissed with the dismissal of its compriser, dismisses the 'efficacy' comprised by it. And the efficacy, being dismissed, dismisses the existence (saltva), as comprised by it; and so the alternative of unequivocal eternality cannot bear arguing. The alternative of unequivocal non-eternality also does not deserve to be adopted (literally 'pocketed'). For the non-eternal perishes moment by moment (22), and it is not capable of efficacy in succession, because it also has no succession due to space and time. For succession is before-and-after-ness, and in the case of the momentary that is impossible. For only on the part of the abiding is there a comprehension of different spaces and times, and successive spaces and times are spoken of. And in the unequivocally perishing that is not found. As is said: "What is anywhere, that is there only; what is anywhen, that is then only: There is in the world no comprehension of space and time by existences" 1?). Nor is succession of earlier and later instants possible in consideration of series: because a series is not an entity, and, even if it were an entity, then, if it is momentary, it is no different 17) Quoted also in Hemacandra's Pramäna-mimāmsā, 1. i. 33, and in Manibhadra's comm. on Haribhadra's Sad-darsana- samuccaya, v. 46. Acc. to M. L. it is an Ajivika saying.

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