Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 23

V. THE VAISESIKA DOCTRINE OF ETERNALITY AND NON-ETERNALITY
Now, denouncing the alternatives, unequivocally eternal or non-eternal), approved by them, he says -
V. Entity which down to the lamp, up to ether, is of the same nature,
without breaking away from the seal of the Syadvada, -
that, they say, is in one case simply eternal, in another simply non-eternal.
Thus the chatterings of the foes of Thy precepts. (15)
Down to the lamp, beginning with a lamp; up to ether, with the ether for limit; each entity, the essential nature of everything; of the same nature: 'the same', like; 'own-nature", own-form: that which has this is so.
Furthermore: The own-form of a thing is, we say, the consisting of substance and State. And so the Chief of Expositors (said)): "That which is possessed of origination, destruction and permanence, is existent (sat)". How is there a possession of the same nature? He gives the reason by way of a specification, without breaking away from the seal of the Syadvada: 'syad' is a particle signifying 'not unequivocally': and so 'Syad-doctrine' is the doctrine of non-unequivocality. And that is the acceptance of a single entity variegated by a plurality of attributes, namely eternal, non-eternal, etc.: that is what it comes to. Thereof the seal, i. e. the limitations. That which does not break through, does not transcend, that, is "not breaking away from the seal of the Syadvada". For, as a king, while relying simply upon rule (true policy), holds his royal authority, and all people are unable to transgress his seal, because on transgressing it they lose all their goods, so, while the great Syadvada monarch is victorious and free from rebels, all the things do not transgress his seal, because, on violating it, they would lose the consistencey of their own nature.
The statement of the same-naturedness of all entities is the ground for rejecting the contention approved by others, that one (kind of) entity, ether (space), etc., is simply eternal, and another (kind of) entity, lamp, etc., is simply non-eternal. For all positive existences are, when viewed as substances, eternal, but, when the view of them as states is substituted, they are non-eternal.
Then, to begin with the lamp (-light) accepted by the opponent as altogether non-eternal, he points the way to an explanation of its eternality and non-eternality, thus: the atoms of light, which have taken on the state of a lamp, when, of themselves from failure of oil, or through the impact of the wind, - they relinquish their state as light, are not altogether noneternal, although passing into another state in the form of darkness, (16) because in the form of the substance, matter, they persist. For their non-eternality is not proved simply by the fact of the destruction of their former state and the origination of their new state. The sub
1) In the Vaiseṣika system some things, e. g. God, selves, space, atoms, inherence, are eternal, others, e. g. things compounded of atoms, are non-eternal 'products' (karya): see V.-sutra, II. i. 13, 28; ii. 7. 11; III. ii. 2,5; IV. i. 1,4 etc. The Jain view, here expounded,is to the effect that everything is in one aspect eternal, in another non-eternal.
1) Umāsväti (cf. p. 18) in Tattvärthadhigama-sutra, V, 29 (M. L.).