Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 20

IV. THE VAIS ESIKA DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALITY
AND PARTICULARITY
Next, in order to elaborate just this reflection upon the methods of a correct system, and putting aside the validity of the truths approved by others, he now, with a view to refuting in the first 6 verses, the truths adopted in the Aulūkya doctrine"), confutes first of all the therein comprised universality (sāmānya) and particularity (viseșa) ). IV. Existences, possessing of themselves conformity and difference,
are not of a form to be dedueed from other existences: by asserting on ground of a distinet self-reality,
on ground of a self-reality which is not so, a duality, the unskilful trip up. 'Did exist, do exist, will exist', - (that means) existences, things denoted (padārtha), namely self, matter, etc.; those; of themselves, means of themselves only', because of the maxim: "Every statement indeed they record as with restriction")) (sc. with eva, 'only');
") The Vaišeșika philosophy, said to have been founded by a Kaņāda, of whose problematie name Ulaka was a likewise much discussed variant. In the present context there is no sign of a derisory intention in the choice of the name, which folk-etymology derives from ulūka, 'owl'. The priority assigned to the system among the views selected for criticism may have been due to its status as a general exponent of physical and, in combination with the Nyaya, of logical conceptions: here it was at variance with some leading principles of Jainism. In the Şad-darsana-samuccaya of Haribhadra, which is a succinct, non-controversial, summary, the order is (1) Buddhism, (2) Nyāya, (3) Samkhya, (4) Juinism, (5) Vaiseșika, (6) Mimams, (7., extra) Cārvāka.
It may not be superfluous to mention that in consequence of frequent intercourse and debate the Indian schools of philosophy have always been familiarly acquainted with each other's tenets and arguments. The problems and arguments, and also the illustrations, tended to become stereotyped and classical: and from a certain period onwards the larger works (e. g. the Nyāya-manjari of Jayanta and the Tattvasamgraha of Santiraksita and Kamalasila) systematically refute the rival doctrines. But perhaps the Jain authors are more apt, as was natural, to include in their polemics the whole group of orthodox systems seriatim. At any rate it seems that in the procedure followed by the present text and commentary and in the argumentation there is practically nothing that had not been adduced with greater fulness in Jain writings of an earlier date, e.g. the Sammati-tarka of Siddhasena Divãkara.
2) Two of the six/seven Vaiseșika categories (see V.-sútra, I. i. 11, and Colebrooke's Essays, ed. Cowell, II, pp. 308-9). They are regarded as reals and as the basis of genera, and individualities: they are attached to things by a relation termed samavä ya, 'inherence', which differs from sam yoga, 'conjunction, by being actual without a process of joining (a-yuta-siddha), and which is also the connection between substances (dravya) and their qualities (guna) and actions. The universals, or genera, differ in range, from 'existence', the most extensive, through the intermediate 'universality-particularities' (saman ya-visesa), down to 'potness', etc.: particularity exists absolutely in atoms only, differentiating them from one another, but thus serves as basis for all degrees of difference in things. The universalities and particularities are held to be eternal and to have a distinct own-nature; but they are not credited with existence' (sattā), which is confined to substances, qualities and actions. For full Jain discussions of sämänya and viseşa see Sammati-tarka, pp. 687-699, and Prameyakamala-mārtanda, foll. 136-155.
The gist of the Jain argument, which will explain itsell, is that universality and particularity are involved in the nature of everything and not imposed from outside by virtue of a relation of inherence'.
*) This is a maxim (no. 58, p. 103 in Hemahamsa Ganin's N yāyasamgraha), or principle (nya ya), of interpretation, such as are apt to be quoted, as also are practical proverbs (laukika nyaya), in Sanskrit discussions.
2.