________________ 76 Introduction flash forth simultaneously. The object appears, the eye sees and the eye-consciousness knows it. This is called the direct knowledge of an object."! Therefore, although there are several conditions, still, since the condition of eye is prominent, it is said that the eye sees. The prominence of the eye is evident, since the clearer the eye-sight, the clearer the perception. It is, therefore, well said "(In fact) the eye sees, but we use such (metaphorical) expressions : 'the consciousness sees." The Kosakara in his Bhashya examines this Vaibhashika theory. He points out that, in this particular context, there is no real difference between 'seeing' and 'knowing', although we have such usages as the eye 'sees' or the mind 'knows'. The Vaibhashika seeks to support his point by referring to a sutra : 'chakshusha rupani drishtva". S The Kosakara maintains that this should not be taken literally. We do use such expressions as 'the cots cry', when in fact we mean the children (in the cots) cry. Similarly, the organ of eye is a seat or a door (dvara) through which the consciousness 'sees' an object, although we say the eye 'sees'. But even the expression 'consciousness knows is not to be taken literally, since there is no consciousness apart from knowing. The knowledge does not grasp, the eye does not see, the object does not offer itself to both. All dharma being momentary are incapable of any activity; what we call action is nothing more than their coming into existence in a sequence determined by the law of pratitya-samutpada. There is neither an actor, nor an action apart from the mere flash of dharmas.* 1 Ado. p. 32. 2 Ibid., p. 33. 3 This controversy is recorded in the Kathavatthu, where the Mahasanghika too quotes sutra. The Theravadin's interpretation is identical with that of the Kosakara. Buddhaghosa in his Vm. clearly states that it is chakkhuvinnana which 'sees' the rupa and not the chakkhu. See Adv. p. 33, n. 1. 4 See Buddhist Doctrine of Flux, pp. 71ff.
