________________ 118 Introduction known through the pioneer works of Stcherbatsky and Poussin. An elaborate Vaibhashika reply to these arguments of the Kosakara as contained in the "Shun-cheng-li-lun" (Nyayanusara") of Samghabhadra is also available to us in Poussin's other monumental work called 'Sarvastivada.'? The Dipakara's treatment of this topic is essentially not different from that of Samghabhadra. But, unlike the latter, it is brief and appears like a restatement of the Vaibhashika position given in the Bhashya. The same Scriptures are quoted and the same arguments are advanced by the Dipakara. We shall, therefore, here summarise these arguments in brief and note such points that occur only in our Vpitti. The Dipakara opens his exposition by stating the four traditional theories on the Sarvastivada,* viz., bhavanyathatva (change of existence), lakshananyathatua (change in the aspect), avasthanyathatva (change of condition) and anyathanyathatva ( = apeksha = contingency) advocated respectively by Dharmatrata, Ghoshaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva Of these, he says, Vasumitra's view is authentic because it explains the doctrine of three times with the theory of karitra (activity). He then advances the traditional four arguments in support of the doctrine of three times or 'universal existence': (1) The reality of past and future dharmas is spoken of in the Scriptures. (2) There can be no production,of a result without an abiding past deed. (3) A perception depends on two things, viz., an object and a base. (8) There can be no cognition without an object. . After quoting several sutras (also quoted by the Vaibhashika in the Bhashya) in his support, the Dipakara takes note of a counter-scripture advanced by the Sautrantika. The latter maintains that a dharma cannot exist in past and future, 1 The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 76-91. 2 LVP:k. V. 25-28. 3 MCB. V. (1937), pp. 1-157. Poussin here gives a complete biblio graphy on this controversy (pp. 7-8). 4 Adv. pp. 259-60. .
