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46
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I
what is non-existent cannot be produiren, etc. etc. (Sankhyakārika, 9),-becomes invalidated ; because as there is nothing incongruous in the production of the Definite Cognition (which has not been existent), so there would be no incongruity in the production of any other non-existent thing ;sivailarly, just as there is production of the non-existent Definite Cognition, and the securing of the particular Means for the said production, and as there is no possibility of the said Definite Cuguition being produced from all sorts of Means (Wrong, Doubtful and the like).-and as even though non-existent, the Definite Cognition is brought about by only such means as are efficient for that purpose,--and just as these Means have the nature of the Cause', 80 exactly could it be also in every other case [and the Premies of the Sikhya would thus become annulled).-(25)
TEXT (26)
IF IT BE HELD THAT THE EFTECT, WHICH HAS BEEN Amanifesled
(LATENT, IN THE CAUSE), ACQUIRES manifestation THROUGX THE CAUSES”, -THEN (THE QUESTION IS) WHAT IS THIS manifestation
OF THE EFFECT - IT CANNOT CONSIST IN THE APPEARANCE (PRODUCTION OF A PECULIARITY IN ITS NATURE, BECAUSE OF NON-DIFFERENTIATION
AND NON-CONNECTION.-26)
COMMENTARY.
The Sarulehya may argue thus" Thonghi, even prior to the operation of its Means, the Definite Cognition is already in existence, yet the Means (Cause) is not futile ; becarise prior to the operation of the Cause, the Cogni. tion was unmanifested (lying latent in the Cause), and subsequently to the operation), it acquires manifestation through that cause ; hence what the Cause operates for is the manifestation of the latent Effect); and so there is no futility."
This however cannot be right; because there can be no such manifestation'. This manifestation consists either (a) in the appearance of some peculiarity in the nature of the Effect, or (b) in the apprehension of the peculiarity, or (c) in the disappearance of what has been obstructing the apprehension of the peculiarity.
It cannot consist in the appearance of some peculiarity in its nature : because would this peculiarity in its nature bo non distinct from the Etiect [Definite Cognition in the case in question), or distinct from it? If it were nondistinct, then, inasmuch as there would be non-differentiation from the Definite Cognition (Effect), it would be as constant as the form of the Definite Cognition itself; and hence there could be no production of it. If, on the other lund, the peculiarity' is something distinct from the Effect (Definite Cognition) itsell,-aven so, there could be no such connection (or relationship) as this is & peculiarity of that'. Because any such connection (between the Effect and its Peculiarity) could only be either one of container and contained
