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STUDIES IN JAINISM
to some Tattvas, every Dravya and each Sat. That is, it seems that the problem would still remain with regard to Ākāśa, Dharma, Adharma and Pudgala. Instead of pressing this point further, let us, however, turn to the next problem. The reason
hy the separate definitions of Sat and Dravya are given is perhaps that, it may be argued, although Umāsvāti takes every Dravya to be Sat, he does not seem to take every Sat to be a Dravya. But this prima facie plausible line of the explanation of the weak link in Umāsvāti seems to turn out to be unacceptable one. For, first. Umāsvāti himself does not seem to favour this defence as he seems to take the sets of things which are Sat and Dravya to be co-extensive. Secondly, both of these could plausibly be taken to be definitions of Dravya or Sat itself. Actually, Pūjyapāda maintains26 that these are not two different things at all. Similarly, he states that these are not two different definitions of different things either. They are the two ways of stating the definition of Dravya itself. But both Umāsvāti and Pūjyapāda seem to be silent on the necessity of giving these two definitions of Dravya. Thus, Dravya and Sat seems to be another set of amphibious expressions in Umāsvāti.
III
So far we endeavoured to point out two possible sets of amphibious expressions in Umāsvāti. Our inquiry shows that, even .fter making sufficient allowance to Umāsvāti, there appear certain weak points in his explanation. Before we close, we wish to draw attention to one more weak point that seems to emerge by way of a corollary. In the commentary on 1.4, Umāsväti states his intention to explain each one of the Tattvas, Arthas or Padārthas definitionally and stipulatively 27 But in the fifth chapter, while talking about Dharma etc., he states that he would explain their nature definitionally.23 Further, in the same chapter a question is raised : How is one to say that there are Dharma etc ? This question is answered saying definitionally. Now, the two ways mentioned in 1.4 are to be understood conjunctively or disjunctively. On each count, there seems to remain some weakness. It conjunctively understood, Dharma etc., which one is to comprehend definitionally alone, are not to be counted as Tattvas even derivatively. Since Tattva, Artha, Padārtha, Dravya and Sat seem to be the same, Dharma etc.,
