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STUDIES IN JAINISM
(a) possible events, both specific and otherwise, (b) possible courses of events, (c) possible kinds of individnals, and (d) possible individuals or particulars. Out of these, in the context of Syādrāda, the first two are ruled out simply because they are basically technical possibilities. Although they are explainable in terms of nomological possibilities, to the extent to which they are at heart etiological or causal possibilities and to the extent to which Jainas are talking about physical objects independently of causal chain in the context of Syadvā da, these possibilities are out of question. The basic issue in Syadvāda is to describe a thing in terms of the features it has. Such features are experientially given to us. Some of them are given along with the thing, others the thing comes to have in course of time. Further, these features the thing comes to have simaltaneously or in succession. This issue is different from the issue of the explanation of either emergence of a thing or its features. It is in this context that etiological possibilities will figure. More importantly, however, we should understand that every genuine characterization of a thing consists in giving a determinate value to indeterminables; and for this determinables need not at all be conceived as causally enchained possibles. Bu
at about the last two? In some texts we get a clue about this. It is argued that the expression “syāt' is envisaged to bring forward the possibilities in the sense of such objects as a ghata.17 But an object may be considered as a kind of individual or as an individual or a particular. Now, out of these the former is ruled out at least so far as the contention of some texts is con The reason for this is that the same text adds that such a possible which is potentially beset with many dharmas must be the one that is existent18. But this view does not seem to be uniformly borne out by all scholars. Jaina philosophers would not have an objection, it seems, to the acceptance of the kind of individuals. In this case, however, the possibilities that would figure in our consideration would not be existential possibilities but nomological possibilities, although they are explainable in terms of conceptual possibilities. But the issue being of the description of a thing absolute conceptual possibilities are out of question, as statements in terms of these are descriptively impotent and hence in the context of making descriptively significant statements quite irrelevant. The conceptual possibilities would figure on
