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NAYAVĀDA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC
S. L. Pandey
The doctrine of Nayas is a chicf characteristic of Jaina Philosophy. Both historically and logically it has been so inalienably associated with Jainism that we can safely say that the whole of Jainism has developed round or from this doctrine. Consequently, there is no Jaina philosophical work which does not treat naya doctrine. Moreover, there are special treatises like Dvyādaśāranavacakra of Mallavādin, Dravyasvabhā vaprakāśaka of Mãilla Dhavala, Nayarahasya of Yaśovijaya, and Nayadarpana of Muni Nathamala which deal only with the doctrine of Nayas. Obviously, this doctrine has its own problems of knowledge; it has its own syntactics, semantics and pragmatics. To deal with all the problems of naya doctrine in a short paper like the present one which I am attempting here, is well nigh impossible. Indeed, I do not want to discuss those problems that have already beer posed, disposed or supposed in the various works of Jainism. Nor do I wish to trace the history of the doctrine or explicate the ipse dixit on it. What I intend to do in this paper is a bit of fresh thinking leading to the reconstruction of the doctrine in the light of modern developments of Logic, particularly manyvalued logic or three-valued logic.
Presented in "Seminar on Jaina Logic and philosophy" (Poona University 1975). Published as a part of the book by the same author, entitled 'Whither Indian Philosophy' Allahabad (1978).
