Book Title: Studies in Jainism
Author(s): M P Marathe, Meena A Kelkar, P P Gokhle
Publisher: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication Puna

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Page 265
________________ 250 STUDIES IN JAINISM not from the fact of having simple name. Further, Sthā panā can be made of an established entity while in giving a simple nama this is not necessary. The Jaina authors have applied the Nayas to these Niksepas. There are two main Nayas - the dravyanaya or the substantial view and the paryā yanaya - the modal view. According to the ayyanaya, nama, sthā panā and dravia niksepas deal with the substance or the dravya and according to paryā ya naya the bhāva niksepa is dealing with the paryaya or the mode or state. Here the question is asked as to how rāma and sthāpanā can deal with the dravya or substance. The answer is the nāma once given refers to the same thing upto its end and same is the case with Sthā panā or symbol. So they refer the dravya, the substance and not the paryāya or mode which is present for the time being. Here again the question my be asked - if all these three, mama, sthā panā and dravya deal with the drvaya then there will be no difference between them. The answer is : We see the particular form, have the particular intention and have the indentification with a particular thing and also have a respect or otherwise and have the result according to our excepectations with reference to Sthā panā, but such is not the case with reference to the simple name and substance. So Sthā panā is different from nāna and dravya. Dravya is the substantial cause of the bhā va or mode and bhāva is one of the modifiations of the substance, but such is not the case with nāma and sthāpanā, Alternative explanation of the nişkepas is also given by Jinabhadra. He says, näma is the title given to an entity sthā panā is its form, causality is its dravya and it being an effect is bhāva. Jinabhadra has discussed the views of upholders of the nämanaya etc. where each one of these views rejects the other views and establishes its own validity. In this case the view of sthāpanānaya is mentioned. Thus nothing in this world is without the form (ākāra ) as the form-less entity does not exist because it is not known in any way and so it is just like the skyflower which does not exist. But at the end Jinabhadra concludes that in the Jaina view all the nayas are accepted and no one of them is rejected; whatever exists in this world is included in these four

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