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SAINA ETHICS AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS
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NOTES
1 Ahimsă presupposes first a world of living beings, both human and pon-human along with the fact that each of them is constantly affecting the other and is being affected by the other either evenly or unevenly. Secondly, Ahissä, presumes that life is dear to all (Fcato itfaa foet,
C, Āyārānga Suttam, Shri Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay, 197 and for all living beings pain is disturbance, fearful and unpleasant. (सव्वेसि पाणाणं ... अस्सातं अपरिणिव्वाणं महन्मयं दुक्खम्, सूत्र ४९, Ayārānga Suttam) This is also expressed by saying that just as pain is unpleasent for onself, so also it is unpleasent for all living beings. (FTE fqai ga g aa Föd vitali, TT 940, Samanasuttam, Sarva Seva Sangha Prakashan, Varanasi, 19 Thus without these two presuppositions the talk of Ahimsā is inconceivable.
It may be noted that these two presuppositions are psychological in nature and the statement of Ahinsa is evaluative in nature. The former are factual or descriptive assertions, while the latter is a normative or a value assertion. Does this mean that value-assertions can be derived from factual assertions, ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical premises 'ought' can be derived from 'is'? This problem of the derivation of 'ought' from 'is' is important in contemporary metaethical discussions, but here I do not propose to argue from the point of view of the Jainist that value cannot be derived from the above-mentioned presuppositions; it is an independent intuition occuring in the context of the stated presuppositions. Had it been a deduction like the angles of a trinagle as equal to two right angles, the whole of mankind would have understood Ahir sā immediately. Thus, though the Jainist maintains the autonomy of normative ethical discourse by maintaining the distinction between facts and values yet he holds that there is some connection between fact and values. Though the two, fact and value, are no doubt distinct, yet they are not unrelated to each other. The relation is not of entailment but it is empirical. Life is dear to all does not entail «we ought not to kill life' but at the same time it can be said that there is connection between the two. The connection is empirical, not logical. What I wish to say is this: it is not necessary that anybody who comprehends the factual assertion 'life is dear to all' will logically adopt the value assertion 'we ought not to kill ', or 'we ought to follow Ahimsa' (he may as well say that we must exploit all to the extent possible), yet the two are not unrelated to each other.
2. The Ayārol (od " UT TOUT, UT 3T5TIT Toat, ut afTaTTOaT, UT of carayal of scatoar, T 132, Ayārānga Suttam, Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalay, Bombay, 1976) remarkably pronounces that none of the living beings ought to be killed, ought to be governed, ought to be enslaved, ought be to distressed and ought to be put to unrest. It is a unique and
