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NAYAVADA AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC
DISCUSSION
M. P. Marathe :
The attempt to connect probability consideration with manyvalued or even three-valued logic is incorrect for former can arise in spite of the latter. Secondly, if many-valued logic is accepted on par with non-Euclidian geometry then applicability issue is redundant. Thirdly, the attempt to interpret Syāt in modal sense without providing for modal operators or modal predicates is confusing. Further, do you propose to assign truth-values to statements along with modal operators or independently of them? The contention that Syādvāda stands against the Law of contradiction is thoroughly misleading. For, even if Syādvāda is in accordance with threc-valued logic, this does not necessarily entail repudiation of the law of non-contradiction, for every system of three-valued logic does not reject the law of non-contradiction. But more importaatly the law is the foundation of consistent communication and if Syādvå da repudiates the law on all levels then it also rupudiates consistent communication.
S. S. Barlingay :
Some systems of many-valued logic repudiate law of noncontradiction. M. A. Marathe
True ; but those systems that repudiate the law on objectlinguistic level don't repudiate it even on the metalinguistic level and not every system of many-valued logic has repudiated the law. Lastly, Mr. Pandey's interpretation of syāt in terms of quantifiers and linking this with Modal logic is misleading for apart from the fact that Syāt docs not mean quantifier, Modal logic is not necessarily tied down with quantified propositions. R. Sundara Rajan :
Lucasiewicz's consideration of many-valued logic arose out of Aristotelian consideration of future contingency as also out of taking temporality seriously. There is no point in camparing Jaina logic with that of Lucasiewicz unless similar concern is shown to be prevalent in both. Nextly, in your contention that many-valued logic has applicability to quantum
