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STUDIES IN JAINISM
proposition, its truth-value changes with time. The propositions that are considered relevant in the context of Syadvāda are descriptive propositions. As sameness of a thing does not preclude it from undergoing change and taking on different features similarly although it is the same proposition that is expressed on different occasions, this in itself should not prohibit it from taking different truth-values. That things change in spite of retaining their identity is a fact. Thus things assume different features in course of time. Correspondingly, on the plane of propositions, Jaina logic seems to hold, that although propositions are the only bearers of truth-values yet they are bearers of not the same but changing truth-values. It accepts change both of truthvalues of a proposition and features of a thing. On the plane of things it seems to argue that things or dravyas are the only entities that can take contrary gunas on different occasions and yet retain their numerical identity at least which can form basis of reidentification and recognition of them. That is why temporally indefinite sentences are taken to be paradigm of informative sentences. In saying this they indeed are in a great company of such masters as Aristotle. The reason for this seems to be that temporally indefinite sentences about a thing are the proper vehicles of communication. This contention obviously presupposes that knowledge properly so called must come in terms of direct acquaintance.
This position, moreover, seems to propound that correspondence between propositions and facts is the basis of assigning truth-values to propositions. Things change and take on new features. Such changed things cannot be matched with older propositions and yet get truth-value truth. In order to be able to cope with the situation of things changing their features and we being able to describe them by means of propositions which not only bring out new features of a thing but also take truth-value truth we shall have to take either one of the following two courses : (a) frame altogether new propositions or (b) allow older propositions to change their truth-values. Without ruling out the first alternative completely the Jaina logicians seems to maintain that to be able to cope with such a situation propositions should also be taken to be changing their truth-values. Either changed proposition or propositions with changed truth-values correspond with changed things and this is how they take truth-value truth.
