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STUDIES IN JAINISM
embarrassing. I do not propose to develop in this paper my theory about the theory of saptabhangi naya or syā dvā da. I only wish to do two things here : One is to ask the question : Can syādvāda form a part of the Jaina concept of logic ? and two : to comment on Matilal's defense of syādväda. My answer to the first question is in the negative. For one thing, the Jaina metaphysical theory called anekāntavādu and syādvā da go hand in hand. The function of syädvāda is to eliminate the element of ekāntikatā from the Jaina view of metaphysical reality.
For another thing, any two syāt-vāk yas are logically consistent if at all they can be said to be true or false. To my mind, there is absolutely no circumstance under which they can be said to be false at all. If true, they must always be true. But then, they are not tautologies either; nor can they be shown to be analytically true in any sense of the term “analytically true'.
Nor does the question of prāmānya arise in their case. Then what justification is there to call them statements at all ? I think that one is right in denying the syāt vākyas the status of assertions. Those who think they can develop the calculus of probabilities on the basis of syādvā da mistakenly treat syāt và kyas as if these were empirical assertions. If it is accepted that they are not assertions at all, it is much the far more difficult to accept that they are empirical assertions whose probabilities could be calculated. Nor do I think that the saptabhangi naya vāda offers us any ground whatever to suggest that what we are dealing with in the Jaina philosophy is a sort of multivalued logic which can be systematized with some ingenuity. How can a set of sentences if they are treated as statements at all each one of which if true is always true has only one truth value true not logically but paralogically only, how can such a set of sentences be used to develop a system of multivalued logic? This seems to me to be sheerly impossible. These considerations make me think that whatever else the Jaina concept of logic be the saptabhangi naya or syā dvāda, from a strictly logical point of view, cannot be said to form a part of it.
I will examine now Matilal's defense of syādvāda.32 Notice that Matilal discusses syādvā da in isolation from the other two theories of the Jainas--the theory of pramāņa or pramāņavā da, and the theory of naya or nayavāda. He mentions the second but leaves out untouched the first. I disagree with him here. In order to
