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STUDIES IN JAINISM
It seems equally doubtful whether mere symptomatic or definitional statement about all of them would establish the point.
But this is a minor point. Let us consider the other way of explaining Dravyas. Here we are told that to be existent is the symptom or definition of a Dravya.19 Understood in this way, anything that is existent is Dravya and anything that is Dravya is existent. This seems to be slippery and ambiguous. It seems difficult to accept that anything that is existent is Dravja, for although thcre are Gunas, Paryā yas etc., just on that count we do not call them Dravyas. Further, when we use 'exists' or its near synonyms with reference to different items, we do not use it in the same sense. For example, we do say, there is a table, there is a ghost, there is an idea in my mind, there is a human society etc. Statement of existence or obtainability docs not necessarily seem to have an ontological implication. For, at least sometimes, existential claims are ontologically sterile and impotent. Hence, even if it is said that Dravpas exist, this does not entail that each one of them is a part of the furniture of the world. Secondly, it also seems difficult to accept that anything that is Dravya is existent. This contention seems to stem from the normal convention that anything that is considered to be a Dravya is mentioned in the nominative case. But unfortunately the converse of this does not hold. For, although Gunas, Paryā yas etc. could be mentioned in the nominative, none of them has a substantial implicaion. Thus, substantive usages of an expression and its substantial import do not necessarily go hand in hand. Substantive usage, however, has substantival implication but not necessarily a substantial one. The distinction could be brought out in a technical language saying that whereas substantial is obiect-linguistic, substantival is metalinguistic. Substantive usage and its substantial implication may seem to meet in some cases: but this is more an accident than a rule, It is for this reason that acceptance of the co-extensivity of the sets of Dravyas and Sats seems very dificult both to entertain and justify. Unfortunately, Pujyapāda goes a step further, saying that the expressions Sat and Dravya are synonymous 20 And that appears more difficult to sustain.
Another anticipatory question is raised by Umāsvāti : What is Sat ? The question is answered saying: anything is Sat, provided it is generated or has a beginning in time, undergoes change and
