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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF LOGIC
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plausible, namely that the Jaina theory of pramāṇa, naya, and suptabhangi or syadvāda have different areas of operation, it is easy to see that there is all the greater probability that the structure of reasoning in the case of the one is different from the structure of reasoning in the case of the other. And, I am inclinded to think that this really is the case. The nayavada has to do with the Jaina niti vis-a-vis the other non-Jaina religious and metaphysical traditions; the saptabangi or syadvada has to do with the Agemas or the Scriptures; and the pramāņas (with the obvious exception of the agama pramāna and also in so far as they do not pronounce judgement on matters of metaphysical realm,) concern themselves with the criteria for the pramanya of what may be called knowledge in the sense of true beliefs about the world of observable facts.
(6) The pramana theory of the Jainas, as I have indicated above, is different from their naya theory and also it is different from the syadvada theory. Where does this difference consist in? A part of the answer I have already given, viz, that these three different theories are designed to do different jobs and that they have functionally distinct areas of operation. Another part of the answer is that the Jaina theory of pramānas deals with the questions of justification of our beliefs about the world and also that it seeks to provide criteria for classifying and evaluating the evidence that we do cite in support of our beliefs. For example, the Jaina legician requires that a hetu (a reason or evidence) must be cited for the thesis, for instance, that the Rohini star will rise, and provi. des the reason in the observable evidence that the Krttika have risen (upalabdhi hatu)6. For another instance, 'There is no jar here; why? because it is unobservable (anupalabdhi hetu). Or, 'The man had a mother', for He had a father' (sahacāra hetu)8.
(7) The Jainas used the anumāna pramāņa for things which are paroksa and not pratyaksa, things which are not known to us in our direct observational confrontation with them. However, the way they developed their theory of anumana pramāṇa, it did no longer remain a theory exclusively of inference from the known to the hitherto unknown, but included in its fold the theory of explanation and of prediction also. From the observation of the rise of the Krttika they could make the prediction that the Rohini star will rise. Similarly, having observed that there is a
