Sambodhi 1981 Vol 10

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, H C Bhayani, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 66

R. D. Hegde
fingers are distant, or of their contraction, is not perceptual. Nor is it inferential as there is no knowledge of Vyapti, the invariable relation, associated with it. Therefore, the cases as such do not come under the cognition produced either through perception or through inference. Even analogy and verbal testimony cannot produce such cognitions; their objects of knowledge are different even according to the Naiyaikas. Hence, the cognition illustrated is entirely different and independent.2
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Another example that the Carvākas take to illustrate, is of the cognition of spreading around of a lamp-light in the night.3 In this particular cognition, a lamp-light spreading around would be perceived. What exactly one perceives here is the 'spreading around in space,' of the lamp-light. The cognition takes place in a person who notices the lamp 'from a distance', and, the time is 'night'; cognition of the person is valid. The cognition is not perceptual, because, to perceive the spreading of the lamp-light, the space should be perceived first. But space is not perceptible. Secondly, the cognition of pervasion here is not inferential either; because inference does not function in the absence of the cognition of invariable relation i.e. Vyapti. The cognition of pervasion here has no precedents for establishment of invariable relation. Therefore, the cognition of the spreading of the lamp-light is quite peculiar to other types of cognitions and obviously. it is different. It may be proved, however, that in such cases, perception and the other recognised means of valid knowledge are not competent to produce cognition.
It is further argued that the cognitions of this kind are not rare phenomena. Cärväkas analyse one more cognition of a lotus-lake sufficiently distant, which is produced by the fragrance sensed in the moving wind. The olfactory sense perceives the fragance first and then the existence of the distant lotus-lake is cognised. Here the knowledge is valid or yathartha. But, this knowledge, as a rule, cannot be produced by the olfactory sense, as the olfactory sense has the capacity to produce the knowledge of fragrance only, not of the existence of a distant lotus-lake. Moreover, as the lotus-lake is very distant, the knowledge cannot be produced by the visual sense, knowledge of the existence of a distant lotus-lake is not even inferential, because inference presupposes syllogism, knowledge of the invariable relation and the like. It is not even known by analogy or by the words of a reliable person. Therefore, the knowledge of the existence of a distant lotus-lake is entirely a different kind of knowledge produced by an independent means of valid knowledge.
Thus, having examined the different illustrations of knowledge, the Caärväkas declare that the ascertainment of the exact nature and number