Book Title: Indian Logic Part 03 Author(s): Nagin J Shah Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti GranthmalaPage 51
________________ 40 INDIAN LOGIC cognition does not require that its object be something real."!" To this is added that the opponent himself does not posit a universal' to account for the cognition of similarity that arises in respect of all the universals' that are supposed to be there. The opponent pleads: "That cognition of similarity might be due to some accidental feature common to all the universals””; the Buddhist retorts: "The same should be the explanation for all cognition-ofsimilarity whatsoever. For example, 'performing the same function x' is the accidental feature common to all the members belonging to the class X."18 The opponent objects: "But the function performed by one member of a class is numerically different from that performed by another, so much so that even the function called 'producing cognition concerning itself is different in the case of these different members; the Buddhist answers : "These cognitionsconcerning-itself are doubtless numerically different but since each of them gives rise to a cognition-of-sameness they are treated as same - on the basis of which sameness the members in question are themselves treated as same."19" The opponent pleads: "But unless a universal' is posited an inference and a verbal cognition should turn out to be impossible, for both nećessarily presuppose the grasping of a universal relationship which must be done through perception if an infinite regress is to be avoided. However, a universal relationship cannot be grasped through perception unless a 'universal' is posited"; the Buddhist retorts: "What inference and verbal cognition cognise is not what constitutes an object of perception but what constitutes an object of thought while this latter object, unlike the former, is something fictitious.”20 The Buddhist point is that a universal relationship necessary for inference and verbal cognition is grasped not through perception but through thought and since what constitutes an object of thought is something fictitious there ought to be no difficulty about maintaining that a funiversal' is something fictitious; the opponent understands him to mean that the object of thought being something fictitious thought grasps no universal relationship, and so asks him : “But whether fictitious or not, the object of thought must be something that is common to all the members of a class"; the Buddhist answers : “An object of thought - which means an object of verbal cognition - is characterised by the feature 'exclusion from the rest' and this feature is certainly common to all the membersPage Navigation
1 ... 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226