________________
162
INDIAN LOGIC
meant the five avayavas of a demonstration and that they are aided by tarka."2 But then the opponent points out that the aphorism makes an independent mention of the five avayavas. To this objection one reply is that this mention is there in order to emphasise that in this case too it will be a fault of demonstration not to employ all the five avayavas, to this is added that the aphorism speaks of the thing demonstrated being 'not opposed to an established doctrine' in order to emphasise that here there should be present no pseudo-probans called viruddha. This way of answering the objection raised is rejected by others on the ground that here there should be avoided all the faults of demonstration and all the types of pseudo-probans." So, according to these latter authors the aphorism speaks of pramāņa and tarka in order to emphasise that here the debater describes as to what perception etc. and what tarka have enabled him to reach the conclusion sought to be demonstrated; similarly, it speaks of the thing demonstrated being ‘not opposed to an established doctrine' in order to emphasise that this thing should not go against an established doctrine acceptable to the debater himself.16 All this, shows how certain minor points are obscurely explained by Jayanta in the course of interpreting an aphorism which by his time had lost all its original importance.)
(6) Hetvābhāsa (Pseudo-probans) The thirteenth padārtha is hetvābhāsa or pseudo-probans. Really, the four padārthas now remaining to be treated have to do with some aspect or other of a defective demonstration, and the present one which is the first of these four stands for a defective probans. In the history of Indian logic the concept of pseudo-probans has played a very important role inasmuch as the logical validity of an inferential demonstration crucially hinges on the proper make-up of the probans concerned. But the Nyāya authors seem to have realised the due importance of this topic only in course of time. This perhaps explains why hetvābhāsa is one of the twenty two types falling under the sixteenth padārtha nigrahasthāna or point-of-defeat and also an independent padārtha in its own right; the point is that the list of twenty two nigrahasthānas seems to have been formulated earlier than the list of sixteen padārthas. However, a clear awareness that the problem of pseudo-probans is an integral part of the problem of inference could have dawned on the Nyāya authors under the
